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ABSTRACT
The focus of this study was the validation of people's
reports of gunfire in two inner city neighborhoods in the
Southeast.

A survey design was used in which 342 people

were interviewed by telephone.

An ARIMA analysis was

conducted to determine the relationship between people's
gunfire reports and 58 days of ShotSpotter recordings.

The

results indicated that the percentage of residents
reporting the presence of gunfire was a valid predictor of
night gunfire.

However, residents' reports of the actual

number of gunshots did not appear valid.

Reports of

gunfire did not appear to have a statistically significant
correlation with 911 gunfire calls.

Residents (96. 7%)

indicated that gunfire had bothered their sleep.

People's

reports of gunfire appear to be one indicator of community
violence.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction

In working as a school social worker, 1· gained a new
perspective on the everyday community life of some children.
The children lived in a relatively small public housing
development about seven miles from my home.

The school

social work position was the result of a government grant to
assist children in becoming academically successful.

My

personal emphasis was working with kindergartners and first
graders.

The goal was for children to gain a good

foundation for later academic work.

The children referred

from the kindergartner classes were different from the
older, often defiant adolescents I had frequently worked
with in years past.

They enjoyed hearing stories and

playing with the stuffed animals in my office.

A common

occurrence was to have a kindergartner teacher ask me to
work with a particular child because he was having trouble
paying attention to class work.

The following is a modified

brief account of children' s communication that had a major
impact on my direction in social work.

The account is also

the basis for questions addressed in this paper.

1

Two five-year-old boys were meeting with me in my
office.

This was their third visit.

My standard routine

was to do calming-activities with the children and
reintegrate them back into the classroom.

Following these

types of activities, teachers· reported that children were
calmer for the remainder of the day, so this seemed like a
somewhat successful intervention.

On this particular day, I

was not prepared for dealing with the material in the little
boys' discussion.

The children began talking about the

gunshots they had heard the previous night.
the other boy that it was firecrackers.
wasn' t firecrackers.

One child told

The boy said it

The other child acknowledged that he

knew it was gunshots but he told himself it was just
firecrackers.

The children proceeded to talk about a man

being shot on a neighbor' s front porch.

One child seemed

convinced that parts of the dead man's brains were washed
off the porch.

My thought was that both of these boys must

be making up these stories.

My house was only a few miles

away, and we do not have any problems like this.

Also, all

of us live in a relatively safe, mid-sized city.

This is

not Chicago.
much TV.

2

I thought the children must be watching too

·Further discussion with parents and grandparents living
in the community indicated that the children were not making
up the stories and that they too often had trouble sleeping
because of gunfire.

Their stories were real, not made-up.

They were bright, caring children, and they were busy trying
to make sense of the violent conditions around them.

I did

not consider it acceptable only to do calmin9 or
socialization activities with someone living in this
situation.

Only dealing with the symptoms of a violent

community seemed very inadequate.
Upon further investigation, studies by Garbarino et al.
( 1 9 9 1) indicate that many housing developments in large
inner cities are �no place to be a child. "

Listening to

gunfire at night is part of children' s daily lives.
Children have more pressing concerns than learning consonant
sounds.

They are often afraid at night and they also worry

about the safety of other family members.

The 1 9 9 9 HUD

report on gun-related crime indicates that people residing
in public housing are over twice as likely to suffer from
firearm-related victimization as other members of the
population.

The report also indicates that public housing

residents cite gunshots as a major crime problem.

Over 50

3

percent of the residents of larger public housing
authorities list gunshots as a major problem in the
community.

The report further states that whether or not

the fears regarding gunfire are warranted, the perceptions
have a direct impact on the sense of community in public
housing developments and their surrounding neighborhoods
(HUD, 1999) .
Further review of community research indicates that the
problems discussed by these children are not unique to their
public housing development.

The following is a review of

what we know about gunfire and violence in public housing
developments and an overview of community violence in
general.
Prevalence of Community Violence

Community violence has a major impact on the lives of
many children living in the United States. In the 1993
report Losing Generations by the U. S. National Research
Council on Adolescents in High-risk Settings, researchers
state that people must reduce the exposure of children and
adolescents to high-risk settings.

The council states that

reducing the risks generated by violent settings is a

4

precondition for reducing many health and life compromising
behaviors of children.

Fortunatei'y, the 1997 "Juvenile

Justice Update on Violence n indicates that the wave of
violence is decreasing; however, the levels are still
alarmingly high.

Bilchik, U. S. Office of Juvenile Justice

and Delinquency Prevention, states·that the forces that were
responsible for the decade-long increases in juvenile
violence are· still with us, but may_now be better able to
counteract them.

The 20% decline in murders by juveniles

between 1993 and 1995 is encouraging.

Still, in 1996,

19, 645 people were murdered by adults and juveniles (UCR,
1997) .

Between 1985 and 1995, 25, 000 juveniles were

murdered in the United States.
Heterogeneous Distributions of Community Violence

For some young people, community life is not a safe
place for physical growth. In 1995, 72% of the juveniles
murdered were male, 31. 7% were 16 or 17 years of age, and
8 3% of older murdered juveniles were killed with a firearm
(U. S. Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention,
1997) .

Presently, homicide is the leading cause of death

for Black males aged 15 to 34 and the second leading cause

5

of death for people between 14 and 34 (Center for Disease
Control, 1998) .

This level of violence is not

representative of other developed countries.

The homicide

rate for males between 15 and 24 years of age in the U.S. is
28 times higher than the rate in Germany, 15 times higher
than in Australia and 10 times higher than.in Canada (World
Health Statistics Annual, 1994) .

On average, the homicide

rate in the United States is .3 to 4 times greater for white
young people and 7 to 8 times higher for black youth than
the homicide rate in other developed countries (Center for
Disease Control, 1994) .

The firearm mortality rate in the

United States is 14. 24 per 100, 000, significantly greater
than the rate of 0. 13 in Asia (Powell & Dahlberg, 1998 ) .
One of the reasons it is easy to underestimate the
seriousness of community violence is that most of the people
discussing issues of community violence live in safe
neighborhoods.

As noted by William Thomas, attitudes

influence social institutions and the resulting actions
(1923) .

It is important that people discussing community

violence give voice to people that are impacted by high
levels of community violence.

Ongoing high levels of

community violence are not the norm.
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In 1995, 84% of the

counties in the United States recorded no juvenile murders.
In 9% of the counties, one juvenile was murdered.

Ten

counties accounted for over a third of the murdered
juveniles in the United States.

Twenty-five percent of all

known juvenile homicide perpetrators were reported in Los
Angeles, Chicago, Houston, Detroit, and New York City.

A

closer look at the data isolates certain neighborhoods
within the counties where the murder rate is highest (U.S.
Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention,
1997)
Many children do not live in safe neighborhoods, but
community violence is not uniformly spread over the United
States.

Public housing developments in Detroit, New York

and Chicago are home to thousands of children, but some are
among the highest crime communities in the world.

Garbarino

et al. (1991) state that the magnitude of environmental
danger in some public housing developments is equaled only
by the level of community violence in locations involved in
armed conflict.

In a study conducted by the National

Institute of Justice in 10 high crime inner city schools in
Illinois, Louisiana, New Jersey, and California, researchers
reported that one in three males in the tenth grade had been
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shot at with a gun, stabbed with a knife or otherwise
injured with a weapon at school or in transit to or from
school.

Furthermore, forty percent of the students reported

that male relatives carry guns in the community (1995).
Since the research was not based on probability sampling and
participation was voluntary, the findings may not be
representative of the community.

The findings do indicate

that for many of the 1, 591 young people in the study,
community life is not safe.
Impact of Community Violence

The human pain experienced by people due to community
violence is beyond current measures.

The exact costs of

community violence for medical care, rehabilitation, lost
jobs, and educational productivity are not known.

No

national registry exists for reporting all gunshot wounds
caused by assaults.

The Centers for Disease Control and

Prevention have collected data on nonfatal gun-related
injuries from a sample of 91 hospitals in the United States
since 1992.

In their study, little information is available

about the event or type of weapon used (Zawitz, 1996).

In a

study by Cohen and Miller, the estimate for firearm assault
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costs for injury and death in the U.S. was $63. 4 billion in
1992, with costs for medical care, mental health services,
emergency transport, insurance administration, and police
services included (1995) .

Another estimate for the cost of

firearm injuries is over $20. 4 billion in costs for
hospital, medical care, long term disability and premature
death, with 8 0% of the cost paid by taxpayer dollars (Rice,
1993)
Impacting many children are the neurological and
developmental consequences of living in an ongoing state of
fear.

Garbarino states that chronic community violence

requires children to adjust developmentally in order to
survive (1997) .

Friedlander indicates that a great societal

problem is children being wounded by the trauma of community
violence.

Many are then left with impaired ability to

maintain effective interpersonal relationships and reduced
adaptive competence in educational performance and
employability ( 1993) .
Perry states that children are malleable rather than
resilient, and community violence impacts the neurological
development of many children (1997) .

Studies by Perry

indicate that the brain organization of children raised in
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an environment characterized by community violence develops
a stress-response apparatus that is excessively active and
reactive.

He states that for some children a physical

change within the child' s brain occurs that results in an
altered cortical modulation ratio and a resulting
predisposition to behave in an impulsive, aggressive,
reactive manner.

Furthermore, the neurodevelopmental

adaptation to the ongoing low level of fear impairs a
child' s ability to learn in a classroom setting.

Sometimes

this results in Wechsler Intelligence scores that are
similar to those of children considered learning disabled
(1997).

A methodological weakness of the research is very

small sample size.

Also, there is a scarcity of

longitudinal studies on the impact of experience on
neurological development.
Studies by Pynoos

&

Eth (1985) and Pynoos (1990) have

also indicated that children in a violent, chaotic
environment become hypervigilant with cognitive distortions
and behavioral impulsivity.
very limited.

The research in this area is

Compounding the observance of causal

relationships between learning difficulties and community
violence are the often coexisting factors of major poverty
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and parents' limited occupational success.

Research design

problems in studies of very poor, violent communities are
addressed later in this paper.
Psychologically, Riechters and Martinez (1993) , Osofs ky
(1997) , Jenkins and Bell (1997) , and Garbarino and Kostelny
(1997) consistently report that exposure to violence is
associated with distress symptoms in both younger and older
children.

Older children's symptoms of distress and

depression are significantly associated with violent
activity involving people they know.

Their findings

indicate that most violent activity reported by children
involves people familiar to them.

Research also indicates

·that psychological distress among high school students is as
strongly correlated to a family member being victimized as
to the adolescent personally experiencing victimization,
regardless of whether the young person witnessed the violent
incident (Jenkins & Bell, 1994).
Children 6 through 12 years of age also experience
distress symptoms related to their parents' violent
victimizations even though they have not witnessed the
violent incidents (Dulmus, 1998) .

Several researchers state

that children in violent communities witness many different
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types of violence with the frequency of exposure to less
severe types of violence being higher (Fitzpatrick &
Boldizar, 1993; Richters
1996).

&

Martinez, 1993; Uehara et al. ,

Osofsky indicates that in high crime areas, children

are taught to sit with their heads below window sills and to
run or dive when they hear gun shots.

Very early in life

children must also deal with loss and grief related to
community violence (1993).

In addition, Garbarino expresses

concern for the parents and community adults exposed to
community violence.

Often, they are too frightened,

preoccupied, or angry to help compensate for risk factors in
the child' s life.

He theorizes that community violence

often diverts and suppresses the abilities of adults to be
psychologically available to children (1992) .
DuRant, Cadenhead, Pendergrast, Slavens and Linder
(1994) indicate that exposure to violence and victimization
are the two strongest predictors of future use of violent
behavior.

Elliot' s analysis of the National Youth Survey

data indicates that the stability of social relationships
and social contextual factors are the greatest indicators of
maintaining aggressive-violent behaviors.

He suggests that

factors in the community such as employment and supportive
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living arrangements impact whether or not young males
transition into conventional adult roles or maintain
involvement in violent behavior.

Community factors, rather

than some underlying predisposition for violent behavior,
are considered the greatest indicators of a life of violent
Elliot contends that in some poor neighborhoods,

behavior.

the dependence of some young males on gangs and an illicit
economy makes transition into traditional adult roles very
difficult.

His research also indicates the importance of

appropriate interventions with children before eleven years
of age.

For children initiating a serious violent offense

before eleven years of age, 45% continued violent careers
into their twenties (1994) .
Research on Community Violence

Most of the limited research on community violence is
conducted in areas with high murder rates.

As stated by

Richter and Martinez, although the murder rate has received
nationwide concern and attention, it represents only a crude
measure of the day-to day community violence characterizing
many neighborhoods.

In their measure of children' s exposure

to community violence, they include the child' s experience
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of witnessing as well as being a victim of shootings,
assaults and physical threats, (1993) .

Most of the studies.

on community violence occur in high crime areas of Chicago,
New Orleans, Washington, DC, Denver, and Detroit.

Even less

is known about community violence in public housing
developments that do not have a high murder rate.

The

levels of community violence in inner city housing
developments with lower murder rates have not been as well
investigated as violence levels in areas with higher murder
rates·.

Little is known about the impact of living in a

moderately violent public housing neighborhood.
Tolan et al. indicate that there is a major need for
more studies that can identify which characteristics and
which indicators in a violent community influence child and
adolescent development (2003) .
Definitions of Community Violence

One problem in defining community violence is that
there is no consensus regarding a definition of community
violence.

The operational definitions of community violence

used by various organizations have serious implications
regarding how much information is available on the scope and
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incidence of community violence.

For example, random

gunfire is sometimes considered a major problem, but gunfire
is rarely measured.

The scope and incidence of random

gunfire is therefore not known.

Crocker and Algina ( 1986}

state that before any measurement of a construct can be
made, it is necessary to establish some rule of
correspondence between the theoretical construct and
observable referents that are legitimate indicants of that
construct.

Currently, different definitions of community

violence use different observable referents as indicants of
commun�ty violence.
Friedlander ( 1993} compares research on community
violence to family violence research.

He indicates that

until researchers obtain the precision, scope, and data for
community violence similar to that gained by the National
Family Violence Survey described by Straus and Gelles ( 1990}
it will not be possible to provide baseline data in the
realm of community violence.

Lorion and Salzman (1993}

expect that with additional research on community violence
regarding prevalence estimates and ethnographic data, it
will be possible to organize a taxonomy of violent
encounters.

Garbarino has stated that in order to fully

15

understand the nature of community violence we need a �child
impact analysis" that addresses all the facets of community
violence (1991) .
The most frequently quoted indicant of community
violence used by researchers is the U. S. Department of
Justice Uniform Crime Report on violent crime (Garbarino
Kostelny, 1997; Richters
1997) .

&

&

Ma�tinez, 1993; and Osofsky,

The Uniform Crime Report (UCR) defines violent crime

as composed of four offenses: murder and nonnegligent
manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated
assault.

All violent crimes also involve force or the

threat of force (1996) .

Certainly this is valuable

information, but the UCR is making no attempt to define
community violence.
violent crime.

They report statistics on four areas of

Even though UCR statistics are frequently

used to describe community violence, they are very clear
about making no attempt to record the composite of all
violent behaviors in a community.
Researchers use different operational definitions to
define community violence.

The operational definition used

by Jenkins and Bell involves observing the actual location
of violent behaviors and noticing whether people in the
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community have the opportunity to personally witness the
activity.

For example, in Chicago in 1993, 56% of the

city' s homicides occurred in a �public way" (e. g. , alley or
street) .

The public nature of this activity makes the

witnessing of violence more probable and increases a young
person's chances of being an accidental or random victim
(1997) .

The operational definition used by Richter and

Martinez includes children' s experience to witnessing as
well as being a victim of shootings, assaults and physical
threats ( 1993) .

The indicants studied by the Center for

Disease Control involved injuries and deaths due to violence
(1998) .

Important to this study is that all definitions of

community violence include the presence of gunfire.
Definitions Used in this Study

The definition of community violence used in this paper
is heavily influenced by Friedlander' s concern regarding the
major lack of research on community violence.

He states

that the National Family Violence Survey provides baseline
prevalence data in the realm of family violence, but a
similar instrument for community violence is not available
(1993) .

A definition of community violence that encompasses
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the entire realm of community violence should include the
sum of all the components of community violence.

The

definition needs to cover the broad range of actions
included in community violence.

The definition of community

violence used in this paper is the sum of all human actions
in a community that harm, potentially harm, or threaten the
physical well being of any person in the community.
Operational modifications of the definition, based on
cultural perspective, are possible.

For example, a cultural

perspective of community violence might exclude arson-elated
injuries and vehicular homicide as indicators of community
violence.

The definition used in this paper is very broad

so as not to exclude any components of community violence.
Components of community violence include but are not limited
to:
• violent crimes reported by the UCR, NCVS, and
CDC;
• objective counts of gunfire;
• acts of intimidation with guns without use of
gunfire;
• use of other weapons such as knives, rocks, and
fists to harm or intimidate;
18

• verbal intimidation that threatens the physical
well being of a person;
• chemical warfare;
• biological warfare;
• pollution used to intentionally harm or
threaten;
•

verbal reports of human actions that harm,
potentially harm, or threaten the physical well
being of a person.

Two problems with the definition are (a) it does not
consider whether the acts of violence are intentional, and
(b) it includes actions that are not traditionally
considered components of community violence.

A related

problem with the definition of community violence is that
accepted operational definitions and measures for many of
the components of community violence do not exist.
As used by Popkin, a public housing development is
considered to be a community (1999) .

Given the massive

scope of community violence, this paper will give particular
emphasis to one aspect of community violence: gunfire in a
community.
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Measures of Community Violence

Basic to the research on the impact of community
violence in vario�s public housing neighborhoods is an
accurate measure of the changing levels of community
violence.

As mentioned above, the most frequently quoted

national measures of community violence are the criminal
activities reported to the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(Osofsky, 1997; Richters and Martinez, 1993; Garbarino and
Kostelny, 1997; and Jenkins and Bell, 1997) .

The measure

used by the Center for Disease Control and healthcare
organizations involves the injuries and deaths reported to
medical personnel (CDC, 1998) .

The exposure to violence

measure used by the National Institute of Mental Health
includes self reports by parents and children of their
personal exposure to community violence.

Methodological

concerns exist in that sizable discrepancies exist between
parents' and children's reports of community violence
(Martinez and Richters, 1993) .
This review analyzes different community violence
measurement procedures used in public housing and, when
available, gunfire frequency measures.

{See Figure 1. 1) .

Particular attention is given to the following questions

20

Medical
Reports

Victimization
Surveys
All measures of connnunity
violence include the
presence of gunfire.

Community
Assessments

Figure 1.1
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Uniform
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Measures of Community Violence
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asked by Messick (1993) and Loevinger (1957) regarding the
construct validity of measures: how well does the test
measure the construct being measured; how well does the
procedure measure something that actually exists; and to
what extent do the interpretations of the measure correspond
to what is measured?

As suggested by Messick (1993),

importance is given not just to the responses, but also to
the persons responding and the context of the measurement.
This includes factors in the assessment setting and in the
environmental background.
Importance of Research on Community Violence

The importance of becoming more informed about the
nature of community �iolence has far-reaching implications
for the practice of social work in inner city settings.
This is perhaps best clarified by an analogy given by
Rothery regarding work with families impacted by family
violence.

He states that for years the effects of family

violence were not addressed when providing family therapy,
marital counseling or other family services.

Most clinical

wisdom as late as the 1970s dictated that harmful forms of
domestic violence were in reality quite rare ( 1993).
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As a

result, domestic violence undoubtedly continued when
something could have been done to stop some of the assaults.
Currently, many programs are attempting to address the
A

needs of people living in public housing developments.

concern is that the needs of a program to provide a certain
type of service may or may not be meeting the needs of the
clients served.

As indicated by Kissel, changing social

conditions requires modifications in the way needs are
addressed (1975) .

In order to address the problems of inner

city violence, service providers need to be informed
regarding what is actually happening in the day-to-day life
of the community.

Rothery contends that because social

workers desire to help, they must have data that informs
their practice regarding what are in reality the most
helpful methods for dealing with a client' s problem.

To not

gather data that indicates the most effective method for
dealing with a person' s problem is considered irresponsible,
inhumane and unethical.

For example, a very caring and

responsive parent may only be offered parenting classes
because this is what an organization has to offer.

Her

maj or concern is the real, physical danger now facing the
client and her children.

Conversely, social workers might
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focus their attention and resources on dealing with the

. .

-�

effects of community violence when the puplic .hqusing
���

neighborhood where they work actually has a very low level
of community violence.

Quantitative data that informs the

social worker of the nature of community violence is
important for their clients as well as for their own safety.
Tolan et al state that more studies are needed that identify
which characteristics and indicators of a violent community
are most influential in impacting child and adolescent
development (2003) .
Focus of Literature Review

As mentioned previously, this review gives particular
attention to exploring what we know about community
violence and gunfire levels experienced by children living
in housing developments.

To more fully understand what we

know about community violence in housing developments, it
is necessary to look at data from larger communities.
Often data from housing developments are aggregated with
data from larger areas.

Also, the validity and reliability

of measures of community violence are reviewed below.
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Issues related to economic status , gender and race are also
addressed.
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CHAPTER I:I

Measures of Community Violence

To explore what we know about community violence and
gunfire in housing developments, this chapter reviews (1)
the major measurement instruments of community violence and
(2) research using the measurements.

The measures of three

organizations are reviewed: U. S. Department of Justice, U. S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development, and Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention.

These instruments primarily

measure violent crimes, which are one component of community
violence.
U . S . Department of Justice Measures

The United States Department of Justice has two crime
measures that are frequently used to describe community
violence.

These two statistical indices attempt to measure

the nature, magnitude, and impact of crime in the nation.
In both indices the behaviors measured include murder and
non-negligent manslaughter, aggravated assaults and other
assaults.

The Uniform Crime Report (UCR) and the National

Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) use different methods and
focus on different aspects of crime (U. S. Department of
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Justice, 1995) .

The methodology and focus of each measure

are reviewed below.

Findings related to community violence

and gunfire are included.

Because information from public

housing developments is aggregated with larger communities,
specific information regarding public housing is usually
unavailable.

Concerns regarding the construct validity and

reliability of measures for public housing are also
addressed.
Federal Bureau of Investigation Uniform
Crime Report (OCR)

Description of OCR
The U. S. Federal Bureau of Investigation Uniform Crime
Reporting Program is a massive data collection program
collecting information from over 16, 000 city, county, and
state law enforcement agencies.

The main objective of the

program is to generate a reliable set of statistics for use
in law enforcement management, operation, and
administration.

Over the years, "the data have become one

of the country's leading social indicators" (p. 1) .

A review

of articles addressing community violence shows that authors
frequently list descriptive statistics from the Uniform
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Crime Reports.

The authors of the 1 9 96 UCR state that the

American public . . looks � o Uniform Crime Reports for
'information on fluctuations in the level of crime.
Criminologists, sociologists, legislators, municipal
planners, the media and other students of criminal justice
use the statistics for varied research and planning purposes
(p . 1 ) •

The Uniform Crime Report began in 1929 to collect
information reported to law enforcement agencies on crime.
The offenses they categorize as Part I offenses are
aggravated assault, homicide, forcible rape, robbery,
burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson.

In

addition - to Part I offenses, the UCR solicits information on
all crimes except traffic . violations.

Offenses called Part

II crimes include all offenses not listed as Part I crimes.
The UCR data are compiled ( 1) through state-level UCR
programs in 44 states and the District of Columbia and (2)
from local law enforcement agencies.

Law enforcement

agencies report crime data to the U. S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation.

The age, sex, and race of

arrestees are reported by crime category.

When state

agencies do not comply with the UCR reporting requirements,
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the UCR program may reinstitute direct reporting from law
enforcement agencies within the state {U. S. Department of
·-· �

Justice, 1997) .
Sources of Error

Following are some of the sources of error that impact
the reliability and validity of the Uniform Crime Report
data.

Many of the sources of error apply only to

populations experiencing environmental factors such as
poverty and intimidation.

Conditions for the likelihood of

systematic and random errors are described.
Inconsistent Data Management System.
Collection of basic OCR data is an enormous task.
Information is collected from over 16, 000 law enforcement
agencies.

The front line for collecting information is the

police officer.

The recording of data is only a very small

portion of their daily duties. · With such a massive number
of people with different training levels recording data,
interrater reliability is possibly a concern.

The

consistency of the observations across raters may be of
interest.
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Instruments for recording data also vary among
agencies.

Enforcement agencies sometimes compile more

detailed information than is required, but this is
frequently not feasible.

Although the cost of computers and

software has decreased, many agencies still have limited
data management capabilities.

According to the National

Institute of Justice National Assessment Program: 1994
Survey Results, 2, 500 directors of criminal justice agencies
indicate that information systems are their highest concern.
Some agencies still rely on paper and pen.
Of greatest interest to sheriffs and police chiefs are
systems to support problem solving and disposition of cases.
Many believe the current systems lack the ability to analyze
repeat call analyses or to trac k progress on problems and
projects.

Most police chiefs and sheriffs report that they

have court information systems {66. 9 percent) , but 7 9. 5
percent indicate that the system needs improvement.

One

judge commented that part of the problem is that there has
been a deluge of computer programs, but many people are slow
to change.

Some respondents are not knowledgeable about the

capabilities of the computer systems they currently have
(National Institute of Justice, 1 995) .
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The concerns

expressed by the sheriffs and police chiefs for information
system needs seem to indicate that many want a better way
for processing and reviewing the data generated by their
departments.

They want more information about what is going

on in their jurisdictions.

Some respondents even want more

current information on social resources in their areas.

The

OCR Program does receive data from 16, 000 law enforcement
agencies; however, the reporting process varies from very
sophisticated data management systems to agencies struggling
to compile the most basic data.

A uniform data management

system within the 16, 000 reporting law enforcement agencies
does not exist.

Limited data management capabilities limit

what is known about violent crime occurring specifically in
public housing.
Missing Data.
As stated by the 1996 Uniform Crime Report {1997) , law
enforcement agencies report data representing ninety-five
percent of the United States total population.

The OCR

authors list several reasons for not including approximately
five percent of the population.

For example, Montana's

estimates for 1995 were not available until after the
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publication of Crime in the United States 1995.

To be

included in the jurisdictional statistics figures for all 12
months of a year, law enforcement agencies must submit
reports before the UCR publication deadlines.

Although most

agencies do submit data to the UCR Program, sometimes the
data does not cover complete annual periods.

Another

problem is that the Federal Bureau of Investigation deems
some reports invalid.

For example, the aggravated assault

figures reported in Kentucky for 1994 were not valid.

Data

is considered invalid when it is found that annexations or
crime reporting procedures are influencing the reported
level of crime.

For purposes of looking at UCR information

pertaining to housing developments, there is no indication
that the missing data from the five- percent of the
population not included by UCR is over-represented by
residents of public housing developments.
Underestimated Offense Rates.
The information from the OCR includes four offenses in
its operational definition of violent crime: murder and non
negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, and
aggravated assault.
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Law enforcement agencies report the

numbers of "actual offenses known" to the UCR Program
regardless of whether anyone is prosecuted or arrested.
Agency counts do not include complaints determined to be
false or unfounded (U. S. Department of Justi�e, 1997) .
One concern is how well the current system is working
for reporting crimes that occur in housing developments.
Research is not available on how complaints in public
housing are determined to be false or unfounded.

Judd,

Smith, and Kidder state that the reliability of measures
depends on the extent to which independent observers concur
in their ratings of the same objects or events (1991) .

The

reliability of what is reported to the UCR is a concern when
the same event is reported in one community as a violent
offense but is not reported as a violent offense in another
community.
Certain assumptions appear to be in existence for the
reporting system to work with a high degree of reliability.
A witness or victim needs to assist the officer by reporting
the crime.

Klockars, professor of criminal justice at the

University of Delaware, further clarifies factors that
influence what law enforcement agencies report to the
Uniform Crime Report Program.

He states that police reports
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are subject to many types of discretion.

Citizen discretion

impacts what they report.

Police cannot report crimes that

are not reported to them.

Also, some offenders successfully

conceal crimes that occur.

Furthermore, police have

discretion in what they report.

Finally, and perhaps most

importantly for high crime areas, for crimes that are
ongoing such as drug dealing, crime report numbers reflect
more the resources allocated to address the crime than a
change in the crime rate (1997) .

The reliability of UCR

· data appears to be very high in the majority of
neighborhoods; however, the accuracy of violent crime data
representing people living in some public housing is more of
a concern.

Underreporting of violent crime in public

housing gives an inaccurate picture of the violent crime
rate.

Differential reliability is a concern when the level

of crime impacts what is reported to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.
Some possible factors impacting the construct validity
of UCR data include the discretion of people involved in
reporting the crime, the impact of officers' fear in
selecting patrol areas that are less potentially harmful to
them, the level of resources allocated for solving ongoing
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crime such as street drug dealing, and the influence . of
residents' income and political strength in proportional
allocation of resources to match a particular level of
community crime.

The certain component of discretion

exercised by citizens and police officers in �igh crime
communities is that their decisions are complex.

Discretion

of citizens, police, and law enforcement administration are
complicated factors that are not . well researched.
The reliability of what is measured by the UCR Program
in public housing developments is also influenced by the
discretion of those reporting.

Pedhazur and Schmelkin

(1991) state that reliability refers to the degree to which
test scores are free from errors of measurement, with
unsystematic errors varying in unpredictable ways.

The

unpredictable way in which discretion influences what crimes
are reported is more of a concern in high crime areas than
in low crime areas.

The systematic and random errors of the

crime data in high-risk areas appear to be higher than the
errors of data from safer neighborhoods.

Differential

reliability is a problem when crimes that would be recorded
in safer neighborhoods are not recorded in high crime areas.
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Community Policing Goals.
The trend of community policing strategies has the
potential of altering the accuracy of what UCR measures.
This very positive attempt to develop law enforcement
behaviors that assist communities in safety has a different
emphasis from the traditional approac� of charging people
with an offense.

The emphasis is on problem solving.

What

effect this has on the UCR accurately measuring violent
activity in communities is still unclear.
The "National Assessment 1994 Survey Results" indicate
that the number one research concern of police chiefs and
sheriffs is to understand what components of community
policing work.

A clear ingredient of the assessment is that

no one really knows which community policing strategies
reduce community violence (National Institute of Justice,
1997 ) .

Community policing measurements of safety perhaps

need more specific indicators of community safety than are
provided in UCR measures.

Since the emphasis in community

policing is on problem solving, recording all "actual known
offenses" may be less of a concern than finding resolutions
to some problems.

Charging people with a crime may be of

less importance than finding a resolution.
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This is

important work, but measurement of crimes may not follow the
traditional reporting procedures.

-

Community policing in
. . .
·public housing developments impacts the reliability of what
is reported to OCR.

Community policing appears to be a very

positive direction for reducing crime; however, the
priorities of the program may result in lower numbers of
crimes being reported than actually are occurring.

This

presents a systematic reliability error for the OCR data.
The influence of community policing creates almost drifting
definitions of offenses with identifying offenses secondary
to problem solving.

As stated by Crocker and Algina,

interrater reliability is a concern when observations are
rated differently by different raters (1986) .
The OCR provides a wealth of information, but
clarifying which population groups it most accurately
represents is complicated.

How well the OCR system measures

violence in regions with high levels of crime and poverty is
not well understood.

According to the National Institute of

Justice report on witness intimidation, one factor that
impacts the measure of crime is the presence of a gun in an
offense.

This report indicates that cooperation with law

enforcement personnel is often problematic when guns are
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involved in offenses (1994) .

According to Joseph

Shuldiner, "experience has shown public housing residents
are reluctant to serve as witnesses because of fear of
reprisals and the inability to relocate away from threats"
(p. 34, 1994) ._

When conditions are present that interfere

with the standard process of reporting crimes, the
reliability of the measure is reduced.
The UCR measurement of violence has been further
compromised by the findings of the National Crime
Victimization Survey 1994 which notes the discrepancy
between crime reported in the survey and the FBI Uniform
Crime Report.

The NCVS data indicates that 58% of the

violent crimes reported in its survey were not reported to
the police.

For simple assault, 64% of the crimes were not

reported; for aggravated assault, 48% were not reported to
police.

One assumes that the data from the UCR and the NCVS

would be more similar.

The data suggest a problem with a

low degree of convergent validity.

Numerous factors

influence which violent crimes are reported to law
enforcement agencies for measurement in the UCR.

The

validity of UCR data is reduced when the data do not tell us
accurately the levels of crime actually occurring.
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The

program does provide very important information, but it is
not a precise measure of violent crime in public housing.
Differential Reliability of Clearance Rates.
The OCR Program . considers an offense cleared or solved
when at least one person is arrested, charged with the
offense, and turned over to the court for prosecution (U. S.
2Department of Justice, 1997) .

The offense is removed from

the UCR count if the charge is considered unfounded.

As

stated by Travis, the impact of low clearance rates is to
This

lower people's willingness to report crime (1996) .
impacts the validity of OCR data.

Below are some of the

clearance rate findings from the OCR 1996 report.
Unfortunately, specific information regarding crimes in
housing developments are not routinely recorded.

Therefore,

crimes in housing developments are included within the data
for larger categories.

This following review gives

particular attention to aggravated assault, assault, and
murder .
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Influence of Population Group .
One category for reporting crimes involves the grouping
of locations by population groups.

(See Table 1) .

Statisticians group locations by the size of cities, and by
whether the areas are rural or suburban.

A metropolitan

statistical area ( MSA) is defined as an area that includes a
central city of· at least 50, 000.

Rural is defined as being

outside of a metropolitan statistical area, not under the
jurisdiction of a city police department, and mostly
unincorporated.

Counties in a metropolitan statistical area

are designated �suburban. "

A suburban area includes (1)

cities with less than 50, 000 inhabitants and a police
department and ·c 2 ) unincorporated areas within a MSA.

In

1996, the violent crime offenses reported by all law
enforcement agencies were 1, 293, 4 08 with 47. 4 percent
cleared by arrest.

This means that for 613, 075 violent

offenses, someone was turned over to the court for
prosecution, and for 680, 332 violent offenses no one was
charged with the ·offense.

Rural county law enforcement

agencies reported the highest percentage of violent crimes
cleared by arrest, 62. 3 percent.

Clearance rates for

violent crimes decreased from 62.3 percent to 39. 3 percent
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Table 1 . UCR Offenses ·Known and Percent Cleared by Arrest and
Population Group , 1996
Aggravated
Murder and
Population
Violent
assault
non-negligent
Group
crime
manslaughter
Rural Counties

Offenses known

51, 466

1, 042

41, 286

Percent cleared
1 2 9 Cities, 50, 000
to 294, 999

62. 3

7 9. 3

65. 0

155, 554

1, 8 46

90, 780

47. 9
Violent
crime

7 3.3
Murder and
non-negligent
manslaughter

58.3
Aggravated
assault

1 26, 364

1, 765

64, 005

39.3

54. 7

52. 1

27 2, 260

3, 397

1 36, 687

41 . 3

63.1

54.6

Offenses known
Percent cleared
Population Group

15 Cities , 500, 000

to 999, 999

Offenses known
Percent cleared
9 Cities,

1, 000, 000 and over
Offenses known
Percent cleared
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Table 1 . continued
Violent
Population
crime
Group

Murder and
non-negligent
manslaughter

Aggravated
assault

Total

11, 008 agencies

Offenses known

1, 293, 4 08

15, 487

775, 204

Percent cleared

47. 4

66. 9

58 . 0

as population size increased to 999, 999 citizens.

The

authors of the report state that the clearance rate is much
higher for some crimes against persons because law
enforcement agencies devote more intensive investigative
effort to those types of offenses.
The data suggest that one is more apt to be a victim of
violent crime in a city with a population over 1, 000, 000 and
that the likelihood of clearing the offense is lower, only
4 1. 3 percent.

The data indicate that violent crime is least

likely to be cleared in a city with a population between
500, 000 and 999, 999 with a 39. 3 percent clearance rate.
Having cases solved does appear to be more of a problem in
mid to large cities than in small cities or rural areas.
The impact of a low clearance rate is to lower people's
willingness to report crime (Travis, 1996) .
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The reduction

in numbers of people reporting crimes results in decreasing
the statistical conclusion validity of the measure.

Again,

this is more of a problem in areas with low clearance rates.
Influence of Geographic Region.
Law enforcement agencies from different geographic
regions differ by crimes reported and rates cleared (See
Table 2) .

As indicated by Tonnies, deep social and

historical differences exist in the way systems of different
regions interrelate (1955) .

The South reports the highest

rate of murder and non-negligent manslaughter, with a 68.5
percent clearance, and the Northeast reports the lowest
rate, with a 70. 7 percent clearance. Information regarding
repeat victimizations is not given.

The UCR data indicate

that one is somewhat more likely to be a victim of violent
crime in the South or the West and less likely to be a
victim in the Northwest or Northeast.
Influence of a Gun.
A further review of aggravated assault data indicates a
much higher rate of clearance by arrest for offenses
involving fists or knives than offenses involving guns .
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Table 2 .

UCR Offenses Known and Percent Cleared by

Geographic Region , 1996

Violent
crime

Murder and
Aggravated
non-negligent assault
manslaughter

Offenses known

388, 725

4, 320

240, 237

Percent cleared

47. 2

60. 7

58. 4

Rate per 1, 000

7. 15

. 079

4. 42

Offenses known

450, 378

6, 343

28 3, 8 39

Percent cleared

49. 2

68 . 5

58. 2

Rate per 1, 000

6. 8

. 096

4.3

Offenses known

178 , 775

2, 158

106, 498

Percent cleared

45. 6

69. 4

55. 0

Rate per 1, 000

4.7

. 057

2.8

Offenses known

275, 5 30

2, 666

144, 630

Percent cleared

46. 0

70. 7

59. 0

Rate per 1, 000

5. 7

. 055

3. 0

Geographic region

West

South

Midwest

Northeast
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(See Table 3) .

For the total population, the clearance rate

for assaults involving hands, fists, feet, etc. , is 65. 2
percent; however, the clearance rate for assaults involving
guns is 41. 9%.

Again, clearance rates vary from different

geographic regions.

In rural - areas the clearance rate for

aggravated assaults using fists, feet, etc. (66. 4 percent)
is closer to the· clearance rate for aggravated assaults
involving guns (64. 1 percent) .

Cities with populations of

1, 000, 000 and over report a much greater difference in
clearance rates.

Those cities report a clearance rate of

64. 7 percent for offenses involving fists, feet, etc. , and a
clearance rate of 34. 6 percent for aggravated assaults
involving guns.
The data indicate that the system is working more
effectively in solving aggravated assault offenses in rural
areas than in large cities.

Cities with populations between

100, 000 and 249, 999 also report large differences in
clearance rates.

The clearance rate for aggravated assaults

using fists, feet, etc. , is 65. 7 percent.

The clearance

rate for aggravated assaults using guns is 30. 6 percent.
The UCR data indicate that aggravated assaults in cities are
much less likely solved if guns are involved in the offense.
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Table 3 . UCR Aggravated Assaults Known and Presence of
Wea22n
Hands
Other
Knife or
FireaJ:m.
Population
Weapon
fists ,
cutting
group
instrument
feet ,
etc .
Rural Counties

Aggravated
Assaults

7, 844

5, 7 19

10, 779

16, 944

64. 1

68. 9

61. 3

66. 4

Aggravated
Assaults·

26, 167

16, 515

33, 37 0

20, 636

Percent cleared

34. 6

64. 5

59. 1

65. 7

Aggravated
Assaults

16, 254

12, 286

25, 205

10, 260

Percent cleared

47. 3

62. 2

5 1. 2

50. 1

Percent cleared
12 9 Cities ,

50, 000 to
249 , 999

15 Cities,

500, 000 to
999, 999

9 Cities,

1, 000, 000 and
over
Aggravated
Assaults

40, 164

27, 162

39, 759

29, 602

Percent cleared

30. 1

65. 0

64. 6

64. 7
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Table 3 .
Population
group

continued
Firearm

Knife or
Other
cutting
weapon
instrument

Hands
fists ,
feet , etc .

174, 593

134, 546

251, 263

219, 377

41. 9

64 . 7

58. 1

65. 2

Total

Aggravated
Assaults
Percent
cleared

In regard to Messick's question regarding factors in the
assessment setting that impact the construct validity, a low
clearance rate is a factor.

People are less likely to

report a crime when the clearance rate is low.

Low

clearance rates and the impact of intimidation in public
housing are explored in the next section.
Influence of Public Housing.
Informat ion provided by the National Institute of
Justice report on "Preventing Gang and Drug-Related Witness
Intimidation" indicates that the clearance rate in public
housing is lower than that for the rest of a city (1996) .
Jeremy Travis, the Director of the National Institute of
Justice, states that many prosecutors and police officers
47

express frustration with their inability to investigate and
prosecute many cases successfully.

Key witnesses refuse to

provide critical evidence or to testify because of fear of
retaliation by defendants or their friends and family.

This

adversely affects th� j ustice system' s functioning and
simultaneously erodes public confidence in the government's
ability to protect people (1996) .
construct validity of the UCR.

This also lowers the

The Messick question

regarding how well the test measures the construct being
measured is important in this regard :

The number of crimes

reported is not valid due to some witnesses' refusal to
provide critical information.

The actual number of violent

crimes is· higher than what is actually reported.

No one

knows how much higher the crime rates would be if victims
and witnesses provided all the needed information for crimes
to be counted in the OCR.

Witnesses' refusal to provide

critical information becomes a source of systematic error
for the OCR.
As indicated by Jeremy Travis, the "fear of
retaliation" factor influences the reporting of crime far
more in housing developments than in suburban or rural areas
(1996) .

48

The validity of OCR data from public housing

developments is much more influenced by fear of retaliation
than data from suburban and rural areas.

The crime rates

listed in public housing developments are frequently
moderate to high, but in reality the crime rates are often
higher than what is recorded.

This is very important for

realistically addressing the level of community crime and
its impact on children' s growth and development.
The National Institute of Justice lists the following
factors in witness . intimidation :
• violence is a part of the iriitial crime;
• the witness has a personal connection to the
accused;
• the witness lives near the defendant;
• the witness is vulnerable (e. g. , the victim is
elderly) .
The report continues that people living in gang-dominated
neighborhoods frequently fall into more than one category,
which increases their likelihood of exposure to intimidation
(1996) .

The factor of vulnerability appears to have an

impact on some people who live in public housing communities
that are dominated by gangs.

Vulnerability is a factor for

children, the poor, and the uneducated when dealing with
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violent offenders. High poverty and high concentration of
children are frequently characteristics of public housing
developments. Goering et al. compared the income of public
housing households with other households within the same
census tract.

The average income for homes in public

housing was approximately $7, 400, and the average income of
other homes in the census tract was $21, 000 (1994) .

Also,

44% of public housing households include children, and the
elderly comprise 35 % of the households {Holzman, 1996) .
Research regarding factors that influence the relationship
between being a child or parent in a high crime neighborhood
and interfacing with law enforcement agencies would be
important for improving the reliability of crime reporting.
Much of the information expressing concern about victim
intimidation is from a National Institute of Justice study
involving 2, 500 directors of criminal justice agencies
(1995) .

No one knows the extent of witness intimidation

because of very limited research conducted in this area
{National Institute of Justice, 1996) .

A 1994 survey of 192

prosecutors indicated that intimidation of witnesses and
victims was a major problem for 51 percent of the
prosecutors in counties with populations greater than
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25, 000.

Thirty percent considered intimidation to be a

moderately serious problem.

In counties with a population

between 50, 000 and 250, 000, 43 percent listed intimidation
as a major problem and 25 percent listed it as a moderately
serious problem (Webster , 1995 ) .

The Uniform Crime Report

cannot function as a valid measure of violent crimes when
victim and/or witness intimidation results in crime not
being reported.

Again, the validity of the report is

decreased in that the numbers of crimes reported is reduced
due to intimidation.

This appears to primarily be a

measurement problem in some areas with concentrated poverty
such as public housing developments.
The increase in victim intimidation is not fully
understood.

Possible explanations listed in the National

Institute of Justice report on intimidation include the
following:
•

de fendant s are younger than in the pa s t ;

•

they appear to have a profound lack of respect for
people in authority:

•

they often feel powerless and socially inadequate ;

• firearms are readily available;
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• increased penalties imposed on people convicted of
violent crime increases the stakes of a prosecution
(Ramsey, 1996) .
A major component of witness security programs is the
management of the witness.

Law enforcement personnel are

cautioned not ·to guarantee security to witnesses because of
liability concerns.

Safety is a problem.

victim is sometimes relocated.

The witness or

The presence of fear among

witnesses or victims does raise questions involving the
risks involved in reporting crime in high risk
neighborhoods.

Sometimes victims must decide if reporting a

violent crime is worth living in increased fear and/or
relocating to a different neighborhood. For most people
living in the United States, the traditional system of
reporting a violent crime increases one' s sense of safety.
The crime reporting system appears to work much less
effectively for citizens living in some high crime areas.
Some areas for further research in public housing
developments include:
• the impact of intimidation on traditional crime
reporting;
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• crime reporting and recording techniques that reduce
or eliminate intimidation;
• officer motivation in high crime neighborhoods;
• specialized officer support and incentives for
officers working in dangerous neighborhoods;
•

community policing techniques that reduce fear in
witnesses and victims;

• alternative police and mental health techniques that
increase neighborhood safety in high crime areas.
Trends in Violent Crime
Influence of Age.
In exploring what we know about community violence, the
UCR data suggests certain trends.

Again, information

regarding housing developments is usually aggregated with
larger communities.

Trends indicated by population group

s i ze, age, race and gender are critiqued be low .

Violent

crime rates are compared for the years between 1987 and
1996.
The UCR data indicate that age is an important factor
in crime rates.

The data for years between 1987 and 1996

indicate substantial increases in murder and non-negligent
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manslaughter among persons less than 18 years of age.

(See

The number of persons under the age of 18

Table 4).

arrested for murder or non-negligent manslaughter increased
by 50. 5 percent from 1, 355 to · 2, 036.

Following a similar

trend, the arrest rate for aggravated assault for the total
population increased by 43. 1 percent, but the arrest rate
for people under the age of 18 incre�sed by 70. 2 percent.
It is important to also clarify, however, that persons over
18 years of age commit the majority of crimes.
Table 4 .

In 1996 1

UCR Total Arrest Trends for Age, 1 9 8 7 - 1996
Under 1 8 Years of Age

Offenses

1 98 7

1 9 96

Percent

1 98 7

18 Years of Age
and Over
1 9 96

Change
Murder and

Percent
Change

1 , 355

2 , 039

+50 . 5

12, 611

1 1 , 4 07

-9 . 5

29, 705

50 , 5 6 0

+7 0 . 2

2 1 1 , 7 93

2 95 , 0 8 4

+39 . 3

77, 415

1 5 4 , 7 62

+99 . 9

4 59, 112

7 1 8 , 268

+56 . 4

Non negligent
Manslaughter
Aggravat ed
As saults
Other
As saults
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for example, 15 percent of the people arrested for murders
and non-negligent manslaughters were under the age of 18
with 85 percent over 18 years of age .

In summary, the 1995-

1996 UCR data indicate arrest rates for people under 18
increased more than for people over 18 , but the majority of
violent crimes are committed by people over 18 years of age.
The 1995-1996 UCR data �lso indicates that age is an
important factor in crime rates.

(See Table 5) .

For murder

and non-negligent manslaughter, people less than 25 years of
age account for 56. 2 percent of all arrests.

For aggravated

assaults, 40. 0 percent of arrests are of people under 25
years of age, and for other assaults 40 . 3 percent . of arrests
are of people under 25 years of age .

For all crimes the

arrest rate declined by 4. 1 percent in the 40-44 year age
group, and further declined 3. 2 percent in the 45-49 age
group.

As mentioned previously, the UCR is a listing of the

crimes reported to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Fortunately, families and child-oriented institutions have
the major responsibility for dealing with violent acts of
young children.

The data for children under 10 years of age

are therefore not a valid indication of violent acts
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Table 5 .
1996
Age

UCR Violent Crime Arrests , Distribution by Age ,
Percent Distribution

Under 10

.2

10-14

5. 3

15-19

22. 7

20-24

17. 7

25-29

14. 8

30-34

13. 7

35-39

11. 0

40-44

6. 7

45-49

3. 7

50-54

1. 8

55-59

.9

60-64

.5

65 and over

.7
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committed by young children.

This only indicates that

appropriate sources of data for young children are the more
traditional institutions that nurture, educate, and guide
children.
Influence of Gender.
Another violent crime factor strongly indicated by the
For violent crimes, 84.9 percent

1996 UCR data is gender.

of the people arrested in 1996 were male and 15. 1 percent
were female.

For aggravated assaults, 17.9 of the people

arrested were female and 8 2.1 were male.

Although males are

arrested more frequently, the arrest rate for females is
increasing at a faster rate than for males.

The 1987-1996

UCR data indicate that the female arrest rate for violent
crime increased 118. 1 percent, whereas the male arrest rate
increased 52.7 percent.

For the 1995-1996 data, the female

arrest rate for violent crime increased . 3 percent and the
male rate decreased 6.9 percent.
The UCR data from 1995 - 1996 indicated an overall
decline in violent crimes.

For murder and non-negligent

manslaughter, the number of people arrested declined 10. 5
percent to 1 3, 937.

The rate for persons under 18 declined
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14. 4 percent to 2, 109.

For aggravated assault, the total

rate of arrests declined by 2. 8 percent to 368 , 8 02.

The

rate for persons under 18 declined by 4. 0 percent to 53, 877
aggravated assaults.

For the total population the rates of

other assaults increased by . 4 percent to 907, 422.

The

assault rate for persons under 18 increased 3 percent to
159, 8 36.

Caution is needed when interpreting the 1996

trends indicated in UCR data.

As indicated by the National

Institute of Justice in their "Annual Report to Congress
1996, " the decline in crime from 1995 to 1996 was positive
news, but the downturn from a record high was unevenly
distributed across American communities.

While violent

crime rates have declined for most age groups, teens
continue to have the highest rate of victimizations
including homicide {1997) .
Influence of Race.
The UCR data regarding race is perhaps the most complex
in terms of factors that influence crime rates.

The UCR

indicates that the murder and nonnegligent manslaughter
arrest rate for black people is 54. 9 percent of the total
rate.
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For aggravated assault, whites comprise 59. 6 percent

and black people account for 38. 1 percent of people
arrested.

For other assaults, 62. 4 percent of the people

arrested are white and 38. 1 percent of the people are black.
Elliot (1994) states that for continuing in a violent
lifestyle, "where one is living may be as important as
whether one is working or livin9 with a partner, " (p. 17) .
Factors in the environment included employment
possibilities, discrimination, poverty, supportive family,
and the presence of an illicit economy.

In the material

presented in the National Crime Victimization Survey 1994,
people who are young, black and male are considered the most
vulnerable to violent crimes.

This survey indicated that

the chances of being a victim of a violent crime were 1 in 9
for black males between the ages of 12 and 15 years of age
compared to 1 in 196 for people over 65.

The likelihood of

victimization increased if a person lived in a household
with an income of less than $15, 000.
The implications of the data lead to a variety of
research questions regarding how the traditional security
system can better fit the needs of people living in poor,
black, urban communities.

Community policing, in some

situations, is attempting to increase trust and belief that
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the law enforcement system is capable of addressing the
safety needs of people living in public housing
developments.

Research does not yet have any clear answers

on how to address the very important issue of goodness of
fit between the public housing's safety needs and the law
enforcement system.
Michael Tonry, School of Law, University of Minnesota,
speaking at a National Institute of Justice Research in
Progress Seminar, stated that "in every country, crime and
incarceration rates for some minority groups greatly exceed
those for the majority.

Perhaps most importantly, there are

comparable disparities both for racial and ethnic minorities
and for some that are not ' visible' minorities" (p. 1,
1997) .

He further states that stereotyping and cultural

behaviors of minority groups often work to their
disadvantage.

Often offenders of a subculture share similar

patterns of dress, speech, socioeconomic backgrounds, and
places of residence and recreation.

In the United States,

young black men are victimized when people assume that
individuals with similar characteristics are likely to be
offenders (1997) .
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Influence of Childhood.
Although the UCR is a vast resource of data for crimes
involving adults, it provides very little information
regarding assaults among children.

Law enforcement

agencies traditionally leave the handling of violent
behavior among young children to their families and the
social agencies that care for them.

The UCR data do not

include information regarding how often children under 1 2
are victimized by the violent acts of other children.
Children who are victims of violent acts live in a three
tier system where discretion is exercised regarding
whether to tell an adult, whether the adult will report
the offense, and whether law enforcement personnel will
consider responding to the offense congruent with their
job responsibilities.

The UCR does not attempt to measure

the violent victimizations of children going to and from
school, playing outside, etc. , unless the offense is
reported to an adult who reports the offense to the
police, who in turn files a petition .

The violent

behavior of young children is generally considered to be
the responsibility of their families or social
organizations.

For example, children under 1 0 account for
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. 2 percent of all people arrested for violent crime.

This

is not a negative regarding law enforcement agencies or
the UCR, but a clarification of boundaries.
The lack of law enforcement agencies' involvement with
children indicates the need for families and social
agencies to assume more responsibility for children's
behaviors that reduce community safety .

Most law

enforcement agencies are not equipped to deal
constructively with the needs of young children .
According to Fielding, the trends toward law enforcement
agencies stiffening penalties and trying children as
adults fail to reduce juvenile crime {1997) .

Champion

states that waivers to try children as adults function
more as a cosmetic response to public concern than as a
viable solution to reducing violence {198 9) .

Law

enforcement agencies lack resources and alternative
interventions for children .

This perhaps clarifies the

need for children's organizations to also address
community violence.
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OCR Summary
In review, the OCR provides a wealth of information
regarding violent crime, but practitioners and researchers
must not assume the reports provide more information than
is indicated.

Some factors addressed above that limit the

validity and reliability of the OCR data in public housing
developments include:
•

discretion in reporting crime;

• fear of repercussions if a crime is reported;
• presence of a firearm in the offense;
• goodness of fit between the person experiencing the
crime and traditional law enforcement strategies;
• age of victim' s offender
Again , as stated by Richters and Martinez , crime rates
represent only "a crude index of the day-to-day community
violence that characterizes many neighborhoods throughout
American cities" { p. 7 , 1993) .

For people living in public

housing developments , the OCR gives us information
regarding what is reported to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.

This is important information , but it

provides only a partial view of the behaviors that comprise
community violence in public housing developments.

Also ,
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the crime data from urban public housing tends to be
combined with other inner city areas.
National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS )

Description of NCVS
In the review of OCR data above, frequent comparisons
and contrasts with the National Crime Victimization Survey
data have been made.

The National Crime Victimization

Survey (NCVS) was instituted in 1972 as a complement to the
Uniform Crime Report.

The survey provides data on victims,

crime incidents, and trends from the victims' perspective.
One concern frequently mentioned in reports by the National
Institute of Justice is that crimes are frequently not
reported to law enforcement agencies.

Approximately 54. 3%

crimes of violence reported in the NCVS are not reported to
police.

The NCVS provides another measure of crimes in the

United States by collecting victimization information from
a sample of approximately 80, 000 people from about 43, 000
households.

It is the second largest ongoing household

survey in the country (NCVS, 2001) .
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The process for administering the NCVS begins with the
U.S. Bureau of the Census randomly selecting a sample from
a rotating panel of all households.

All age-eligible

individuals in the selected households become part of a
panel.

Every six months respondents are interviewed for

three consecutive years.

An exception is made to use proxy

interviewing instead of direct interviewing for the
following cases: incapacitated persons, individuals absent
from the household during the entire field-interviewing
period, and 12-and 13-year-old persons when a knowledgeable
household member insists they not be interviewed dire·ctly.
For people who have telephones, the first and fifth
interviews are in-person interviews and the rest are by
telephone.

For people without telephones, all interviews

are face-to-face.

Many of the questions can be answered by

"yes" and "no" responses in order for people to respond
more freely on the telephone when they are in the presence
of others (NCJRS, 1994) .

Increased Reliability of the NCVS
According to the 1999 NCVS, 62. 4% of the crimes
reported on the survey are not reported to police.

Crime
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report rates vary from 14% to 95%.

Only 14% of thefts

under $50 are reported, but 95% of car thefts are reported
to police.

For crimes of violence, 54. 3% of the crimes
In

reported on the NCVS were not reported to police.

addition, of the crimes of violence reported to police,
60. 4% of the crimes did not result in a police officer
taking a police report.

Stated differently, 45. 7% of the

crimes of violence reported in the NCVS were reported to
police.

Of the 45. 7% of violence crimes reported to the

police, 39. 6% of the crimes resulted in police · data
recorded in the UCR �

The NCVS data indicate that 18. 1% of

the crimes of violence recorded in their data are included
in the UCR data (2001) .

Two major strengths of the NCVS

are (1) recording offenses that are reported to police but
not reported to the UCR, and (2) recording 19. 8% of the
offenses reported to the NCVS but not reported to police
because of personal or private reasons (2001) .
The NCVS also has a more systematic data collection
system.

In contrast to the UCR, the NCVS is administered

by people whose jobs are to administer the NCVS.

Gathering

informat�on for the UCR is a small part of the duties of
officers from over 16, 000 law enforcement agencies.
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In

addition, NCVS field representatives usually reside in the
area in which they interview.

The race and ethnicity of

the representatives generally match the local population.

Sources of Error
Following are some of the sources of error that impact
the reliability and validity of the National Crime
Victimization Survey.

As with the UCR, sources of error

are more apt to occur in populations experiencing poverty
and intimidation.

Conditions for the likelihood of

systematic and random errors are described below.
Underestimated Offense Rates.
A concern listed in the 1999 NCVS is the tendency of
victims to not report crimes committed by offenders who are
not strangers.

Secondly, the NCVS reports that among some

groups, crimes which contain elements of assault could be a
part of everyday life.

They are therefore forgotten or not

considered important enough to mention to a survey
interviewer.

Also, although the intent of the survey is

only to gather information, some may consider it safer not
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to reveal information.

Such recall problems result in an

understatement of the actual rate of assault (2001) .
The process of establishing trust for a NCVS interview
is a complicated factor.

According to Popkin et al. ,

respondents in public housing frequently do not acknowledge
victimizations.

An unwritten rule within some public

housing is to "mind your own business" and not talk about
victimizations that occur (1999) .
Certain assumptions exist for the NCVS to work.
· need to report their victimizations.

People

A problem related to

differential validity may exist if people in high crime
areas do not accurately report to the interviewers.
of intimidation may still be in existence.

Factors

Why repeatedly

answer questions from a 13-page survey and a 2 1 page
incident report when trust and intimidation are personal
factors?

The assumption is that respondents accurately

answer survey questions every 6 months for three years.

The

impact of living in chaotic or high crime areas on NCVS
responses is not known.

Also, what impact does the presence

of a gun in a crime and fear of reprisal have on the
accuracy of information reported?

A related question is the

impact on males of being interviewed by female
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representatives.

Only about 10% of the NCVS representatives

are male, and this perhaps has some impact on the quality of
information given by male respondents.

Data are not

presently available to answer these questions.
In keeping with the focus of this paper on measuring
community violence in public housing, the NCVS gives limited
information on community violence specifically in public
housing.

Until recently, a box was not available to record

whether or not a person lived in public housing.

No

information regarding type and design of the public housing
is available.

HUD has recently developed a victimization

survey based on the NCVS that is specifically for people
living in public housing.

This is discussed in detail in

the HUD section of this paper.
Missing Data.
Iri 1999 the NCVS response rate was 93 % for households
and 89% for persons within households.

A household non

interview adjustment is made for non-responses at the
household level by inflating the weight assigned to
interviewed households with similar income, race, and
ethnicity.

A problem exists that homes with similar
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incomes, race, and ethnicity may vary dramatically regarding
violent victimization.

Also, as suggested by Holzman (1994)

and Popkin et al. (1999) , living in public housing is a
major factor in not reporting victimizations .
Similarly, nonresponses within a household are dealt
with by inflating the weight assigned to the interviewed
persons in the household.

Again, Holzman (1996) has

indicated that victimization levels are higher with self
reports than when someone speaks for another person.
The implication of not interviewing children under 12
years of age impacts what we know about victimization in
children's lives.

Richters and Martinez (1993) indicate

that children report a higher level of victimization with a
self-report than when parents report for them.

Also most of

the questions in the NCVS only address victimizations for
people 12 years and older.

The implication of this is that

little is known about the actual levels of victimizations
experienced by children.

The NCVS data does indicate that

the very highest rates of victimization are for black males
and females in the youngest group for which data is
recorded, the 12-15 year age group.

The rate for black

females is reported as 127 . 5 per 1, 000 persons in this age
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group.

For black males the rate · is 91. 8 compared with an

85. 6 rate for white males and 50. 3 rate for white females.
The black femaie rate is 57. 1 in the 20-24 age group.

In

addition, young people in the 12-19 age group were the least
likely to report violent victimizations to police, only
30. 2%.

The data we have indicate a strong need to be more

fully aware of the victimizations of young people under 12
years of age.
Another area of missing data involves counting data
from series victimizations.

A series victimization is

defined as six or more similar but separate crimes which the
victim is unable to recall individually or describe in
detail to an interviewer.

Since 1980, series crimes are

counted as a single victimization.

The 1979 NCVS report

shows that victimization counts and rates were higher in
1979 when the series crimes were added.

A separate category

for series victimizations is included, but information about
series crimes is excluded from the count of individual
victimizations .

For areas where repeat victimizations are

higher, this is important information when trying to
understand patterns and hopefully, solutions to problems.
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Findings
Regarding community violence in public housing, some
NCVS factors that also are relevant to people living in
public housing include economic level, age, and location of
a violent victimization.

The economic level of people

living in public housing is usually low due to the
guidelines of public housing.

NCVS data related to this low

economic level indicates that the highest violent
victimization level (71 per 1000) is recorded for people
with yearly incomes less than $7, 500.

The violent

·� -

victimization rate declines as income increases with a 30.7
rate listed for people with incomes of $75, 999 or more.
Age is another factor in high violent victimization
rates.

People between the ages of 12 and 15 are three times

more likely to be violently victimized than people between
35 and 49 years of age (Rand, 1998) .

In addition, repeat

victims are least apt to notify police and repeat
victimizations are highest in areas with the highest crime
levels (Travis, 1996) .
NCVS data indicates that most violent victimizations
occur in public places.
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For crimes of violence, the NCVS

indicates that only 5% occurred inside a home or lodging.
Forty percent occurred within one mile of the victim' s home,
26% occurred over one mile but less than five miles from
home, 24% occurred between five and fifty miles from home,
and 5% occurred 50 or more miles from the victims home.
The implication is that people are most apt to be
victims of violent crime if they are very poor, young, and
outside their homes.

Many of these factors apply to

residents of public housing but more precise measures of
community violence in public housing are needed.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention ' s Recommended
Measures ( CDC}

Since the early 1980' s the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention have supported arid promoted a public health
approach to violence in the United States.

Activities of

CDC are based on two fundamental principles: (1) policies,
interventions, and programs for preventing violence must be
firmly grounded in science ; and (2) full participation of
communities is necessary for the development of a sense of
ownership for the problems of violence.

Since 1992, CDC has

been funding projects to further develop the knowledge base
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of information regarding violence (Mercy, Thornton,

&

Crawford, 1996) .
As stated by Powell et al. , individually oriented
strategies are more common than strategies directed toward
communities.

One concern is that CDC funding for

individual-level interventions is easier to obtain,
resulting in a shortage of community level interventions.

A

major reason for the limited number of community level
studies is that the power of studies to establish
statistically significant differences between comparison
groups and an intervention is less than the power of
comparably sized projects with individual randomization
(1996) .

In keeping with the public health direction, Powell

et al. indicate that a future direction for research is to
examine variables that lead to positive community changes in
violence levels (1996) .

Satcher et al. further indicate

that individually oriented strategies should definitely be
continued, but that this work must be complemented by
strategies designed to reduce violence exposure at the
family, peer, community, and societal levels (1996) .

This

emphasis on research is in keeping with the focus of this
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paper regarding the need to address the variables of
community violence.
Suggested Measures

The Center of Disease Control has recently published a
list of suggested measures for assessing violence-related
attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors among youths (1998) .
Following is a review of measures suggested by the CDC that
might be helpful in measuring variables of community
violence.

Two measures are listed for assessing young

people's individual levels of exposure to violence, and four
measures are listed as environmental assessments of the
quality of neighborhood life.

Measures of reliability are

given for most measures.
"Children's Exposure to Community Violence"
The "Children's Exposure to Community Violence" measure
by Richer

&

Martinez consists of 12 items.

The items

include 12 statements and respondents have a choice of four
answers: (1) never, (2) once or twice, (3) a few times, and
(4) many times.

A concern mentioned by Holzman is that the

assessments of adults need to be repeated again after six
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months.

Adults tend to "telescope" violent events and

include events that occurred outside of the time frame
indicated (1999) .

The impact of time on what children

report i� a concern regarding the validity of the
information that is reported by children for a particular
time frame.

The concern that test-retest reliability was

not established was a concern listed by Richters and
Martinez in a National Institute of Mental Health study
conducted in Washington, DC.

They indicate, however, that

they had confidence in the ability of children to provide
useful estimates of violence exposure due to significant
levels of pairwise agreement and because of details of
exposure volunteered by respondents in face-to-face
interviews (Richters

&

Martinez, 1993) .

Richters and

Martinez list the target group for the assessment as
African-American males between the ages of 1 2 and 16.
internal consistency is listed by CDC as . 84.

The

CDC states

that exposures to violence through sounds and sights are
addressed.

The one statement regarding sound is "I have

heard guns being shot. "

Ten statements refer to what the

young person has seen and one statement asserts "my house
has been broken into, " (CDC, 1998 ) .
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A concern regarding the measure of violence exposure
through sounds is that more specific information is needed.
The impact on children of hearing gunshots nightly is
perhaps different from the impact of hearing many shots in
one isolated event.

The measure would not distinguish those

neighborhoods that have a very high frequency of gunfire
from those having significantly less gunfire.

The measure

gives some important information regarding violence in the
community, but it is not a precise measure of sound or sight
experiences that negatively impact the safety of people
living in an area.
"Victimization Scale"
The "Victimization Scale" measure for middle school
students by Nadel, Spellmann, Alvarez-Canino et al. ,
is also listed by CDC.

(1996)

One problem is that reliability of

the instrument has not been established.

The assessment

includes 1 35 items about violent activity at school, outside
of school, in the neighborhood, and at home.

One point made

by CDC is that the field of assessing violept behaviors is
new and very few standardized instruments with established
population norms are available (CDC, 1998) .

The
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victimization scale appears to be in the earlier stages of
its development as a measure of the construct victimization.
Environmental Assessments
All four environmental assessments of quality of
neighborhood are normed to urban residents eighteen years of
age and older.

None of the assessments specifically

measures community violence.
area of neighborhood cohesion.

They do address the important
Bolland suggests that lack

of neighborhood cohesion is negatively correlated with high
levels of community violence (1998) .
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CHAPTER III
Public Housing History , Problems , and Community Violence
Research

The following section will look at (1) the history and
current trends in public housing,

(2) the research and

measurement of community violence and gunfire in public
housing, and (3) the problems encountered in HUD's attempts
to measure community violence in public housing.
Having reliable, valid information about the safety of
community life in public housing is very important in that
the growth and dev�lopment of many children are affected.
Secondly, millions of Federal dollars are spent on public
housing.

This section also clarifies the need for a

reliable instrument that measures community violence or at
least components of community violence.

Material also

indicates the need to reliably measure gunfire in public
housing.
History of U . S . Public Housing

The public housing program began in 1937 with the
passage of the United States Housing Act.

The legislation
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authorized the formation of public housing authorities with
each agency retaining ownership of its public housing ·
property.

The federal government does not own public

housing authorities.

The direction of public housing

changed when the 1949 Housing Act provided housing for
families needing help with rent.

In 1969, the emphasis

shifted to federal funds providing rent subsidies for low
income families choosing to live in public housing.

This

financial shift in public housing resulted in public housing
authorities changing from economic self-sufficiency to
dependence on federal funds for a substantial amount of
housing authorities' budgets (Holzman, 1996) .

The number of

public housing authorities has grown to 3, 224 .

U.S. public

housing units are home to 3. 3 million people.

Thirty-five

percent of the residents are elderly, and 44% of the
households include children (Bolland

&

Mccallum, 1999) .

Problems in Public Housing

Materials from HUD are often very candid regarding
problems in public housing and the attempts being made to
address these problems.
the answers.
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HUD does not presume to have all

An example of this is the evaluation of the

HUD Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program.

The HUD-sponsored

evaluation states that the sites selected for the program
were not the areas most in need of the program, and the
program was created without adequate information about the
nature and extent of crime in public housing.

The report

further states that the centralized control of the program
creates violations of local concerns and intolerable delays.
Some of the problems in public housing mentioned in the HUD
report on transforming public housing include: (1) it
concentrates the very poor;

(2) it creates concentrated

high-poverty neighborhoods; (3} federal micro management
aggravates many problems; and (4} market discipline does not
apply to public housing (Pate, 1984) .

Although involvement

of residents in planning is increasing, historically,
housing choices for people living in poverty were managed by
those in authority.

Viewed in a light of a capitalistic

economic order, the opinions of people without money were
given little value (Weber, 1905) .
Public housing staff and the residents do not have
control of all of the factors involved in - improving the
livability of public housing.

The direction of moving

people out of poor neighborhoods to low cost housing in
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middle and upper income neighborhoods is often met with
resistance from the targeted neighborhoods (HUD, 1991) .

In

a report by the Advisory Commission on Regulatory Barriers
to Affordable Housing, barriers to placing low cost housing
in various neighborhoods are addressed.

Across the country,

deeply ingrained and widespread problems exist when attempts
are made to place low income housing in communities.

Some

of the factors listed that tend to keep +ow cost housing and
its residents out of middle and upper income areas include
building and zoning regulations and the attitudes of local
builders, realtors, bankers, public-sector officials, and
neighborhood residents.

The "Not in My Back Yard Syndrome"

for location of low income housing is an important factor in
concentrating large numbers of poor people together in poor
neighborhoods (1991) .

Also, race is still a factor in

placement of public housing.

HUD indicates that despite

efforts to integrate public housing, white public housing
residents tend to live in predominantly white neighborhoods
in more affluent areas.

The majority of African-American

public housing residents continue to live in minority
neighborhoods that have a higher degree of concentrated
poverty (1995) .
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In the 1998 HUD report on "The State of the

Cities, " the authors state that overt discrimination in
housing has been driven underground and is much more subtle.
Present public sector discrimination is more apt to take the
form of rental terms and conditions that exclude minorities
(1995) .
History of Research in Public Housing

Research oh public housing has been through several
historical changes.

Prior to 19$1, HUD produced a yearbook

of statistics on public housing authorities and its tenants.
These data provided research opportunities to better
understand public housing.

The Statistical Yearbook was

discontinued in 1981, and national level profiles of public
housing have become almost nonexistent.

In Holzman's

historical account of factors impacting the "information
gap" of research on public housing, two factors are
considered of major importance:

(1) the discontinuation of

the HUD Statistical Yearbook; and _ (2) the lack of
government-sponsored research on crime in public housing
during the Reagan administration.

The resulting reduction

of public housing research continued into the early 1990's.
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More recently, the research interest of the 90' s was
primarily in drug trafficking in large public housing
authorities.

Given that the trend for HUD public housing �s

smaller developments, the research on large developments is
not congruent with the research needs for the public housing
direction of smaller developments (Holzman, 1996) .
Present Trends in Public Housing

Presently, the emphasis in public housing is to
increase the livability of public housing and to increase
accountability of its programs.

In materials on . changing

the nature of public housing, HUD is searching for answers
for improving the environment within public housing (1997) .
One change of direction in the public housing community was
the demolition of over 3 0, 0 0 0 units within a four year time
frame ending in 1996 (1997) .

The current trend in public

housing is an emphasis on architectural redesign with
smaller, less densely configured low-rise and townhouse
public housing developments.

High-rise developments are a

maintenance nightmare with elevators and plumbing accounting
for the majority of high-rise maintenance budgets.

Limited

research indicates that big-city low-rise and townhouse
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public housing are more vulnerable to some crimes (including
gunfire and gang activity) than high-rise developments.
Low-rise and townhouse public housing in rural and suburban
areas do have lower crime rates, but the face of big-city
crime is not the same (Holzman, 1996, and Zelon et al. ,
1994) .
Current Research on Public Rousing

In keeping with the trend of increasing accountability,
an emphasis on research focusing on what is working well in
public housing began in 1995.

As stated by Stegman,

Assistant Secretary for the HUD Office of Policy Development
and Research, the department made an attempt to review
evaluation research on violence prevention initiatives used
in public housing developments.

The task was to focus on

programs that were successful in reducing access to
firearms, conflicts between youth as individuals and as gang
members, abuse of drugs, and drug trafficking.

The

conclusion was that there are numerous violence prevention
programs, but there are very few evaluations of the programs
(1997 ) .
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As stated by Holzman, HUD Program Evaluation Division,
"valid statistics on the level of crime in public housing do
not exist. . . . Even the largest public housing complexes
typically represent small fractions of the specific
geographic units for which official crime statistics are
kept.

Hence, our knowledge of the volume and type of crime

in public housing and how crime in public housing compares
to that found in other neighborhoods is woefully
inadequate, " {p. 331, 1998) . Once procedures are devised,
tested, and proven to reliably yield valid data, the
effectiveness of crime control and treatment strategies can
be evaluated {Holzman, 1999) .
As a result of the scarcity of treatment and crime
control evaluations in public housing, HUD shifted the
emphasis from composing a document that assisted in
implementing violence prevention initiatives to creating a
manual on how to evaluate violence prevention efforts.

The

manual states that evaluation is needed in order to share
information about what works with other agencies, improve
programs' effectiveness, and demonstrate program
effectiveness to the community and funding sources {1997) .
For measurement of a program's effectiveness, HUD suggests
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using research methods that address outcome objectives such
as (1) reduction of crime in a complex ; (2) residents
feeling safer ; and (3) observation of desired changes in the
neighborhood.
As listed in the HUD manual "A Guide to Evaluating
Crime Control of Programs in Public Housing, " a substantial
problem in conducting evaluations in public housing is that
housing authorities do not typically have an evaluation and
research staff.

The manuel suggests that housing

authorities hire outside evaluators (1997) .

Below the

findings of the two suggested HUD sponsored evaluations
mentioned in "A Guide to Evaluating Crime Control of
Programs in Public Housing" are reviewed.

Both evaluations

make some attempts to address community violence in public
housing.

Also, two other HUD sponsored evaluations that

address public housing community violence are reviewed.
Particular attention is given to how community violence is
measured and the identification of problems encountered in
measuring community violence.
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Research on BUD ' s Public Housing Drug Elimination Program

One area that has received much research interest is
HUD' s Public Housing Drug Elimination Programs.

The

research . highlights the complexity of research in public
housing.

One HUD-sponsored evaluation conducted by Abt

Associates Inc . between July 1991 and July 1993 examined the
local Public Housing Drug Elimination Programs (PHDEP} .

The

research is being included here because of (1) its attempts
to measure drug-related crime in public housing and (2)
measurement problems encountered by researchers gathering
data in public housing developments.

The programs were

instituted in 1988 to help public housing authorities and
Indian housing authorities combat drug use and drug-related
crime in -their developments.

The amount awarded to 617

grantees between 198 9 and 1991 was $246, 384·, o o o.

The grants

varied in size from $7, 857 to $ 12. 5 million.
The evaluation consisted of a mail survey of all PHDEP
programs and an intensive study of 15 local PHDEP programs.
The surveys included questions regarding implementation of
programming in five broad areas: law enforcement/security
programming; treatment/intervention; physical improvements,
prevention; and resident initiatives.
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The survey consisted

of two parts with part I composed of closed ended questions
and part II composed of open ended questions. The response
rate for the mail survey was 78 percent with 4 8 1 grantees
responding.

The final report on the evaluation states that

no statistically significant differences were detected
between programs that responded to the survey and those that
did not in terms of housing authority size, geographic
region and grant size.

Inherent in the response rate is the

indication that participation in the evaluation was
apparently not mandatory for developments that had received
grant money. According to Abt Associates Inc. , evaluations
of the programs' effectiveness were subject to all the
weaknesses of self-reporting with no external validation of
grantees' perceived effectiveness of programming and no
consistent measures of effectiveness of programming across
sites.
With major considerations for the limited quality of
the data received by Abt Associates Inc. , following are some
of the comments from the report.

Two percent of the

programs included residents in planning and/or hiring
decisions.

Of the 134 grants in which resident patrols were

to be implemented, fear of retaliation from drug dealers was
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considered a reason for lack of resident participation.
One-third of the resident patrols were not implemented in
any way and some were stopped out of concern that the
environment was too dangerous.

Use of UCR data to report

drug activity appeared to be more a reflection of resources
for arresting dealers than for frequency of drug dealing
. activity.

Housing developments characterized by high levels

of open drug dealing with gang warfare, drive-by shootings,
and intimidation were the least successful in implementing
their programming.

The common occurrence of gunfire was

thought to impact residents' fear of anti-drug activities
and to increase mistrust of housing authorities and police.
The evaluation does indicate the need for a measure of
community violence that is not influenced by participants'
fear of getting hurt.

Also, a measure of gunfire is needed.

According to Abt Associated Inc. , the conditions in
public housing are such that dramatic improvement can not be
easily or quickly achieved.

They considered the moderate or

mixed success PHDEP achieved in Los Angeles and Chicago
remarkable.

Again, the process of mea�uring success was

extremely inexact.

The measures used were not considered

reliable; therefore, the findings are not valid.
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Research on Crime and Crime Prevention in Public Housing

A second HUD-sponsored evaluation by the Research
Triangle Institute is the "Survey of Public Housing
Residents: Crime and Crime Prevention in Public Housing"
(1994) .

The HUD Office of Policy Development and Research

(PD&R) contracted with the Research Triangle Institute to
design and conduct a nationwide survey of public housing
residents.

The focus of the survey was (1) residents'

perceptions of criminal activity,

(2) opinions regarding the

perceived effectiveness of various anti-crime initiatives,
(3) levels of crime in public housing, and (4) perceptions
of criminal activity.
The survey was conducted over a two-week period with
over 1, 500 public housing residents interviewed by phone.
The aggregate response rate was 75%.

The stratified random

sample of telephone numbers was identified in stages with
the initial phase involving the HUD selection of 25, 5 10
addresses stratified by size of public housing authority,
census region, and type of housing.

The allocations to

strata at this and later stages were in proportion to the
population counts of public housing units indicated by HUD.
From this list, a random sample of 12, 755 addresses was

91

selected with 5, 426 later being matched to telephone
numbers.

From that group of telephone numbers, 3, 112 were

selected for another stratified sample.

From this group,

1, 479 households completed the interview and 68 partially
completed the interview.

Of the remaining households

selected in the stratified sample, 135 refused to
participate, 5 15 telephone numbers were disconnected, 42
were wrong connections, 47 were ineligible, 268 addresses
were incorrect, 110 spoke a language other than English or
Spanish, and 441 households did not answer (1994) .

An

obvious measurement problem regarding the implications of
only surveying households with telephones is addressed later
in this paper.
In attempting to measure aspects of community violence,
the survey addressed individual factors of community
violence that impact the safety of . people.

Findings of the

survey include (1) the most commonly perceived crime problem
was the presence of drug dealers with 48% of all respondents
considering this as. either a big problem or somewhat of a
problem; (2) the second most frequently cited problem was
people shooting guns; and (3) people living in low-rise
mixed/family housing perceived the greatest problem with
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gangs (1994) .

In an analysis of this research data by

Holzman, Kudrick, and Voytek (199 6) , crime-related problems
were highest for townhouse dwellers in the largest public
housing authorities.

A person shooting guns was the most

frequently reported crime problem for people living in
developments with over 501 units.

Gunfire was a close

second to drug dealing in small and medium size
developments.

The results indicate that gunfire in public

housing is a problem.

The frequency of gunfire was not

measured.
The issue of telephone interviewing in public housing
presents numerous complications regarding the validity of
the collected data and how representative the data are of
residents without telephones. The National Victimization
Survey indicates that people without phones are at higher
risk of victimization.

However, for people living in public

housing Holzman and Piper did not find a statistically
significant difference in the victimization rates between
people with and without phones (1998 ) .

They hypothesize

that being nonwhite and on the very lowest end of the income
distribution may create a type of vulnerability to
victimization that does not vary much among residents.

They
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quickly point out that more replications of their research
are needed since they were only focusing on two inner-city
developments where homogeneity of the locale and physical
characteristics of the respondents' housing may have
influenced the results (1998 ) .

Also, in exploring telephone

interviewing, they allude to Lynch' s analysis of Klecka and
Tochfarber' s research (1978 ) in which Klecka and Tochfarber
failed to reject the null hypothesis of no difference
between victimization rates recorded by telephone interviews
and victimization rates using the NCVS, which involves some
in-person interviewing.

In Lynch' s analysis of the data,

the null hypot�esis was rejected in a two-tail test.

The

analysis indicates that telephone interviews produce
estimates of victimization that are higher than in-person
interviews (1993) .

The discrepancy in results calls into

question both sets of results and indicates the need to more
fully research questions about telephone interviews.
Holzman and Piper suggest that the uniqueness of the
public housing population with respect to victimization may
lead to some revisions of the conventional wisdom that in
person interviews obtain a higher degree of valid data.
their research, the mode of interviewing resulted in
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In

significantly different rates of victimization.

Telephone

interviews resulted in significantly higher rates of
victimization than in-person interviewing (p < 0. 05, two
tailed test) .

They also indicated that victimization rates

were higher when people were interviewed individually rather
than when they spoke for others in their households.

The

victimization rates people recorded for others was lower
than the rate listed when each person was individually
interviewed (1998 ) .

With regard to measurement problems,

caution is given that use of telephones for interviewing and·
speaking with only one spokesperson per family impacts the
results of research.
HUD ' s Creation of an Instrument Measuring Victimization

To address methodological issues and reiearch
strategies in measuring crime in public housing, Holzman and
Piper created the Victimizati�n Survey of Public Housing
Residents (VSPHR) .

The instrument is patterned after the

National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) , but the
objective of the VSPHR project was to create an instrument
and associated methodology appropriate for evaluating the
effects of crime prevention programs in public housing
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{ 1998 ) .

The VSPHR project was the first systematic attempt

in public housing to apply the National Crime Victimization
Survey approach to public housing.

Modifications in the

NCVS provide information about the type of public housing in
which people live as well as more in depth data on the
nature of crime in their housing developments.

In contrast,

the NCVS has only recently added a check box . for people to
identify themselves as living in public housing.

With the

VSPHR, questions are specifically asked about behaviors that
endanger th� safety of people in public places.
The goals of the VSPHR project were ( 1) to explore
whether the NCVS approach would work in public housing where
crime is a problem and { 2) to develop tools for evaluating
the effectiveness of crime prevention programs in public
housing.

Holzman and Piper consider the VSPHR project a

step toward transferring the technology of the U. S. Census
Bureau to a more usable tool for public housing authorities.
Methodological issues and research strategies explored in
the project included using the NCVS approach of purposive
sampling for selection of developments; not paying
respondents; and not paying participants in the research.
Under "lessons learned, " they suggest checking the
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prevalence of telephones before deciding on the interview
mode, and verifying of phone numbers so that wrong numbers
do not take the place of correct numbers and thereby lead to
under coverage of phone households (1998) .
Like the NCVS, the VSPHR is a lengthy survey.

The

survey consists of 16 pages for the household respondent and
16 pages for each individual respondent in the home.
addition, the incident report is 19 pages.

In

The survey asks

questions about vandalism, acts of violence, theft, gunshots
heard, and drug deals- seen.

A major problem is that

interviews are costly and time consuming (Popkin et. al. ,
1998) .
Research Using the VSPHR

The first official test of HUD' s victimization survey
(VSPHR) was implemented in the assessment of the Chicago
Housing Authority's Henry Horner Homes Revitali zation
Initiative (1998) .

The test of the instrument demonstrated

that (1) non-resident and resident interviewers could
successfully administer the survey in public housing and the
nearby community and (2) that respondents in public housing
and the nearby communities were willing to cooperate .

A
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problem was discovered in obtaining data from respondents
who had experienced multiple victimizations.

People were

reluctant to fill out an incident report for each
victimization.

As a result, a modification was made in the

VSPHR with respondents filling out only one report for each
type of victimization reported (Popkin et. al. , 1998 ) .

The

problems of interviews being costly and time consuming
remained.
The research on the Henry Horner Revitalization Program
addresses many aspects of community violence including
gunfire.

For this reason this paper provides more detailed

information on this work.

Also, the study is a major

example of the important role research can provide in the
effective use of money and resources.

The assessment has

given planners vital information on possible problems to
consider in developing the additional $1 billion allotted
HOPE VI housing.

The evaluation identifies factors that are

potentially very important to the future success of some
HOPE VI projects.
Evaluation of the early stages of the Horner
Revitalization Program indicates many problems in the
program .
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Large amounts of money are being spent to change

the architectural design of public housing, but other
factors within the development have limited the
successfulness of the program.

Factors limiting the success

of the HOPE VI Program include crime, lack of employment,
lack of social cohesion in the community, and insufficient
_ social and employment services.

The VSPHR data provided by

residents living in the newly designed development indicate
that overall crime is about the same except that gang
related crime is worse.

�Periods of quiet are defined as

days or weeks when less gunfire can be heard and few
residents are shot - not times when the violence has
ceased, " (Popkin, et. al., p. 10, 1998) .

Victimization

rates for people living in the Horner Development were 7 2
per 100.

The victimization rate for people in the

surrounding community was 44 per 100.

Data from the in

person interviews indicate that victimization rates are
highest for people living less than five years in the Horner
Development and for people without telephones.
One concern expressed by the residents in the
assessment is that security and services in the Chicago
Housing Authority (CHA) property have decreased.

In 1994,

CHA spent approximately $77 million on anti-drug programs
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and security.

The 1998 budget reduced the amount to $39

million with 152 security officers being dismissed.

The

development looks much better architecturally, but the crime
level has made it unlikely that people with higher incomes
will choose to live in this community.

People are skeptical

that residents can work together to create a safer
community.

Seventy-seven percent of the respondents do not

believe that �people in this neighborhood can be trusted, "
and neighbors are often perceived as potentially dangerous.
Other findings indicate an unemployment rate of 42% and
insufficient social and employment services.

A needs

assessment of community services mandated in the Mothers
Guild decree indicates a lack of services, but no funds have
been appropriated for services to address these needs
(Popkin, et. al. , 1998) .
A related study recently completed by Popkin et al.
consisted of a qualitative and quantitative longitudinal
analysis of the Chicago Housing Authority's Anti-Drug
Initiative.

The Anti-Drug Initiative from 1994-1996 was

Chicago Housing Authority's most in-depth attack on crime
with an average of $80 million spent each of the three
years.
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The research was conducted between 1994 and 1996 in

three buildings in each of three developments including
Henry Horner.

Multiple methods used to assess the impact of

the anti-drug programs included ethnographic observation of
each development, a content analysis of the Chicago Sun
Times and the Chicago Tribune from 1988 through 1996, six
rounds of in-depth interviews with a small group of key
residents, two rounds of interviews with staff implementing
the anti-drug programs, and four waves of door-to-door
surveys using the VSPHR.
The findings of the evaluation were not encouraging.
The three main areas evaluated were ( 1) physical disorder,
(2) social disorder, and (3) violent crime. Conditions
worsened in all three areas.

Conditions were better in

1995, but gains were quickly lost in 1996.

Two factors were

considered to impact the loss of improvements made in 1995.
An unexpected increase in gang violence was attributed to
arrest of many of the gang leaders.

Residents indicated

that weakening the leadership of one gang resulted in an
increase in gang violence to reestablish the new gang
leadership and turf.

Similarly, the closure and demolition

of some buildings created a gang power vacuum in neighboring
areas that resulted in more crime.

The results of changing
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Thirdly, in

hig he r

in May

t wo

t h an

in

December for each of the three years measured (Popkin et
al. , 1999) .
The findings of Popkin et al. reflect that measurement
of community violence in public housing is very complicated
(1999) .

Official crime counts do not come close to the

actual levels of victimization mentioned by residents of
some housing developments (Garbarino, 1997 ; Perry, 1997 ;
Riechters

&

Martinez, 1993) .

Also, the processes of

measuring individual levels of victimization are very costly
(Popkin et al. , 1998) .
Research on "Bot Spots " in Public Housing Developments

In attempting to get a more manageable view of crime in
public housing, Mazerolle and Terrill shift the focus from
the entire public housing development to units of analysis
in the development where crime is the most prevalent (1997) .
They call their focus a problem-oriented policing project
that identifies specific locations within developments where
most problems occur .

In six public housing developments in

Jersey City, New Jersey, random samples of residents were
asked to identify areas they avoid because of high crime.
They indicated that three-quarters of the common areas
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identified a � having violent crime are in low rise
developments.

Mazerolle and Terrill state that public

housing sites need to be viewed according to the
distribution of crimes within the development rather than
the entire site being considered a crime "hot spot. "

They

caution that each housing development is different and that
one size fits all programming is very inappropriate.

Crime

within the area needs to first be analyzed before initiating
crime control and prevention activities (1997) .
A similar approach to identifying the "hot spot" areas
within the public housing developments is crime mapping.

In

crime mapping the locations of reported crimes are . recorded
with areas having the most prevalent crime rates identified.
Presently, research is being conducted in Charlotte, NC, and
Memphis, TN, to further address measurement problems in
identifying crime "hot spot" areas in public housing.

In

Charlotte, Rutgers University' s Center for Urban Policy
Research is working with the Charlotte public housing agency
and the local police department to track · 911 calls and
police activities in order to identify crime "hot spots. "

A

second part of their project is to develop software to map
crime data in public housing.
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The software will be used to

identify "hot spots" which may appear as parking lots,
individual apartments, or other public places.

The hope is

that resources can be more effectively utilized when the
nature of crime in public housing is better understood
(Holzman, 1 � 99) .
As mentioned previously in the review of research on
public housing community violence, recurrent measurement
problems include (1) many people in public housing do not
report crimes, and (2) police activity in recording crimes
in public housing, for offenses such as drug dealing, are
often more a factor of allocation of police resources than
frequency of drug trafficking behaviors.

A related factor

is indicated by Jeremy Travis, National Institute of
Justice: repeat victimizations are highest in high crime
areas, but repeat victims are less likely to notify police
(1996) .

In 1999 crime mapping, Holzman considered the

medical trauma reported at hospitals as the most valid
source of crime data (1999) .
Concerns Regarding Measures of Community Vio1ence

In summary, measuring the level of community violence
in many public housing developments is very complicated.
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Gains have been made in measuring some factors of community
violence.

The Center for Disease Control Centers measures

the number of murders in the United States and their
National Electronic Injury Surveillance System continues to
collect firearm-related injuries from a population-based
sample of 91 emergency departments throughout the country.
The Uniform Crime Report provides information regarding the
crimes reported to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and
the National Crime Victimization Survey provides
victimization data on general trends of victimization in the ·
United States.

Both provide massive sources of data

regarding crimes and victimizations that occurred two years
ago.

More specifically, measures of victimization of ·

residents in public housing continue to be developed. .
Measures of children's levels of victimization and exposure
to violence also contribute important data.

Presently,

crime mapping is being developed to provide specific
information on crimes reported in public housing.

Many

gains have been made in the area of measuring community
violence, but the frequencies of many of the factors of
community violence are unknown.
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For example, children and

adults often list gunfire as a concern, but gunfire is not
measured in public housing.
Additional measures are still needed.

As stated by

Satcher et al. :
Given the great perceived urgency for addressing this
problem (violence) , it is not surprising that many
people feel we must act right away, without taking time
to await the result of calculated scientific trials.
Urgency lead� people to think there will be - indeed,
that there must be - an answer that is simple and
readily discoverable.

Yet the results that are

beginning to come forth suggest that the answer will
not be so simple, discoverable, yes; simple, no. . . .
Interventions must encompass individual and social
factors (p. v, 1996) .
Measures that are cost efficient and responsive to
frequent changes in violence levels are needed.

Having a

measure of community violence that is sensitive to immediate
changes in the nature of community violence would be
helpful.

For this measure at least to assess some factors

of community violence during different times of a day or
week would make possible a more appropriate allocation of
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security resources.

A time sensitive measure for a week

could also provide valuable information about the
effectivenes_s of interventions in a community.

Being more

informed regarding the level of violence in a particular
community would make possible modifications in programming
to better fit the safety needs of a community.
Regarding the effects of community violence on children
· living in public housing, we actually know very little about
the levels of community violence in many developments.
Having a better measure of the level of community violence
would allow a better understanding of its impact on
children.

As indicted by Richters and Martinez, the term

"community violence" is used with a vagueness that tells us
very little about what is actually happening in a specific
community (1_9 9 3} .

As stated by Nunnally, the measurement

validity of a variable is necessary before interrelations
among variables can be examined (1978 } .

Higher degrees of

measurement validity are needed when measuring assaults,
shootings, and verbal threats in public housing.
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CHAPTER IV
Methodology

The guiding research question of this study was how
valid are individuals' reports of gunfi�e in their
communities.
Hypotheses

The foll
. owing research hypotheses were formulated to
better understand the validity of individuals' reports of
gunfire:
1.

A positive relationship exists between recorded counts
of gunfire and individuals' reports of gunfire.

2.

A relationship exists between recorded counts of
gunfire and 911 calls about gunfire.

3.

Individuals' reports of gunfire have a higher
correlation with recorded gunfire than with 9 11
gunshot calls.

4.

A relationship exists between individuals'
reports of gunfire and reported assaults (two-tailed) .
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Rationale

A criterion validity study of individuals' reports of
gunfire and recorded counts of gunfire is important for
three reasons.

The first reason is related to the lack of a

comprehensive measure of community violence.

Basic to the

process of d�veloping a comprehensive measure of community
violence is the need to establish the criterion validity of
indicators of community violence.

Gunfire in a community is

one indicator of community violence.

The most frequently

mentioned indicators of community violence are data from the
Uniform Crime Report, the National Crime Victimization
Survey and the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) .

These

frequently used indicators provide important but .limited
information.

The Uniform Crime Report (UCR) underestimates

the actual occurrence of violent activity.

The National

Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) suggests that only 62. 4%
of the crimes reported on the survey were reported to
police.

The NCVS data also suggests that only 1 8. 1 % of the ·

crimes of violence are reported in UCR data (2001 ) .

The

NCVS is limited in use in that it takes approximately 2

years to complete.
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Available information is not current nor

is it available for all areas.

The information from the CDC

is based on people being wounded and reporting to a
hospital.

No assumption is made that all victims of

community violence report to a hospital.

Thus, further

indicators of community violence are needed to address these
limitations.

The need for additional clarity in the level

of community violence is especially vital in communities
where people do not report violence out of fear of
retaliation (Travis, 1996) .
The second reason for establishing the criterion
validity for family reports of gunfire is that community
leaders' response to gunfire reports are apt to be tailored
by people who do not live in the designated community.

If

the perception is that people are sensationalizing the
actual count, concerns may be less apt to be addressed.
Similarly, if individual reports are considered more a
reflection of what families hear on television programs than
in their neighborhoods, interventions will address
television programming or viewing times.
The third reason for establishing the criterion
validity of family reports of gunfire is that over 50
percent of residents of larger publi� housing authorities
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list gunfire as a major problem in the community (HUD,
1999) .

Many interventions have been implemented to reduce

gunfire, but measurements to assess the effectiveness of
these interventions are scarce.

The most commonly used

measure is to compare UCR data as pretest and �osttest
criteria.

For community policing programs, which lists

. reporting of crimes as a major goal, an elevated UCR rate
may be more an indication of community policing working
rather than of an increase in community violence.
A major problem exists in evaluating the effectiveness
of programs to improve the safety of communities with
repeated episodes of random gunfire.

As mentioned earlier,

a comprehens_ive measure of community violence does not
exist.

Establishing the validity of individuals' reports of

gunfire would be an initial step toward addressing the
problem of random gunfire.

In addition, Tolan et al.

indicate that neighborhood monitoring and protection of
youth are basic to reducing youth risk in high crime
neighborhoods (2003) .

Identification of gunfire patterns

would provide a tool for al locating safety and treatment
resources to better meet needs.
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Target Population

This study was conducted in two areas designated as
gunfire "hotspots" by a local police department in the
Southeast.

The rationale for studying this population was

that the areas were identified as having problems with
random gunfire.

The term "hotspot" was used by police

departments to indicate that the designated areas had
frequencies of gunfire 911 police calls that were 2 to 3
· standard deviations above the norm for that city. · Families
living in a one-half mile radius of the designated hotspots
were the target population.
Sampling

The sample size for this study was 1 16.

For 116 days

an instrument built for the purpose of recording gunfire was
positioned to collect recordings of gunfire incidents.
Each area consisted of a mixture of dense�y spaced
apartments a�d more sparsely _ placed single family houses.
In order to ensure that each household had an equal chance
of being selected, a simple random sample was selected from
each area.

The two random samples were selected from a

listing of telephone numbers in a one-half mile radius of
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the "hotspot. " If a family was unavailable, the next
randomly selected family was interviewed.

One adult from

each selected family was asked about the gunfire frequency
in the last 24 hours.

All adult residents of the area were

considered potential reporters.
interviewed.

No children were

Interviews were conducted by telephone.

Addresses with telephone numbers listed in the most current .
local City Directory provided the information for random
selection.
Instrumentation

Four instruments were used in this study_.

One was a

questionnaire that asked one adult in a family about recent
gunfire activity in . their neig�borhood.

Prior . to asking any

questions, individuals were assured that no identifying
information would be recorded.
A second instrument recorded the occurrence and time of
gunfire at a rooftop height.

�he sensor detected gunfire in

an approximately one-half mile radius, depending on wind and
background noise.

Modification in the sensitivity of the

instrument was reduced in order to decrease the likelihood
of human voices being recorded.
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The instrument consisted of

a laptop computer adapted with the One Sensor ShotSpotter
software and a Shotspotter sensor.
The third instrument was the publicly . assessable data
reported to the local emergency management center and to the
local police department.

This information included 911

calls reporting gunfire, reported assaults, and murders.
The fourth instrument was the local weather station' s
recordings of precipitation and atmospheric temperatures for
each day.
Gunfire Detection Technology

The most difficult aspect of this research was
obtaining appropriate equipment for conducting the research.
This search for equipment took many forms.

Initially the

concern was getting a recording device that would record for
at least 24 hours.

An engineering student modified a VCR

and a microphone in order to record for 24 hours.

This

presented privacy issues regarding the recording of human
voices.

This led to numerous consultations with engineers

and physicists regarding filtering the recordings of sound
waves.

An environmental expert checked the possibility of

using equipment that monitors sound pollution.

Numerous
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security consultants gave information on the latest security
equipment used by law enforcement officials.
Two national trainers with the U . S. Federal Bureau of
Investigation offered information on the latest technology
for detecting gunfire.

Two companies in the United States

were mentioned by both consultants.

Both companies were

contacted, and each developer described their technology.
The type of technology offered by one company detected
gunfire within a building.

This system only worked with the

presence of solid walls to reflect sounds.

The technology

was used in a few prisons and other high security buildings
where there was a heightened concern for the occurrence of
gunfire.
The second company mentioned by the FBI consultants
involved the u�e of equipment that identified gunfire
incidents and made recordings of gunshots immediately
available to law enforcement personnel.

This technology was

invented by Dr. Robert Showen, an electrical engineer and
space physicist.

He provided the concept and initial

dev � lopment of the ShotSpotter.
pulse in a detected incident.

ShotSpotter analyzes each
Within 10 seconds after a

shot is fired, the system alerts a dispatcher of the event.
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A four-second sound recording is saved along with each
incident.

The annunciator beeps and flashes a small red

light intermittently until a dispatch views the event and
clears it.

The entire location and notification process is

completed within 6 to 10 seconds after the shot was fired.
Within a few additional seconds the dispatcher listens to
The

the sound and decides whether to dispatch an officer.
firm, Shotspotter, Incorporated was founded in 2002.

The

company has worked at various sites to reduce the levels of
random gunfire.

They received a contract from the U. S.

Department of Justice for a double installation in
Charleston and North Charleston, South Carolina in 2003.
The need for this study was technology that could
filter human voices, record the sound of gunfire, and keep
recorded information highly confidential.

In January, 2003,

Dr. Showen stated that he thought it would be possible to
modify ShotSpotter· for use as a single sensor.

He and Dr.

Robert Calhoun modified the software and a laptop computer
for use in this study.

The equipment was received July 3,

2003.
The sensor began recording data in January, 2004.

The

main problem at the first site was basic use of the system.
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There were minor problems related to use of the equipment,
but even minor problems resulted in loss of recording days.
A simple problem could shut down the research.

The main

problem in use of the equipment at the first site was the
learning curve for the person conducting the study.

Gaining

familiarity with use of the equipment was important.
Technical assistance by phone addressed technical problems.
The One Sensor Shotspotter recorded close gunfire with
clarity. . The occurrence of bottle rockets, firecrackers
bricks, or thunder were distinguished from gunfire by the
sounds of the recordings and by the appearance of waveform
plots.
The first site (area A) was at the corner of a location
The

that was considered a "hotspot " for gunfire activity.

placement of the Shotspotter equipment was based more on
concern for not getting the equipment s·tolen than for
proximity to gunfire.

The device was placed in a highly

· secure business that had a history of no break-ins.
business had double security fencing.

The

Doors were

electronically controlled and motion sensors were placed
throughout the building.

The plus of this location was very

little concern about the safety of the equipment.
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The

problem was that only gunfire in close proximity to this
business was recorded.

The initial recordings indicated 25,

8, 3, and 17 shots in the 2:00 a. m. to 4:00 a. m. time frame
for the first four days of recording gunfire.

The gunfire

was easily distinguished by the appearance of waveform plots
and the sounds on the recordings.
A problem was that the sensor did not pick up gunfire
. 5 mile from the sensor.

Three gunfire assault emergency

calls occurred close (within . 25 mile) to the site and had
corresponding gunfire recordings on ShotSpotter.

Two

emergency gunfire calls for service from distances closer to
. 5 mile did not have corresponding gunfire recordings on the
Shotspotter equipment.

The building with the attached

sensor was located in the lowest region of the neighborhood.
This was against the advice of Dr. Showen, but the
overriding concern was protection of the equipment.
Placing the sensor in a valley appeared to reduce the
ability of the sensor to pick up gunfire at the apartment
buildings located at the far end of area A.

A change in

sensitivity settings in the Shotspotter equipment also
resulted in decreasing the range covered by the Shotspotter
sensor.

This was not reversed due to concerns regarding
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recording human conversation.

The equipment did record

unintelligible yells during some gunfire recordings.

A

corresponding data collection problem for the area around
the apartment buildings was that the City Directory listed
less than 5 phone numbers . for people living in that housing
development.

The gunfire activity in that region of area A

was therefore not reflected in either the ShotSpotter or
interview data.
At the second site the sensor was placed on a very tall
building.

A major problem at that site was picking up AM

radio frequency waves.

Lt. Robert . Hubbs, a consultant from

the Charleston project, suggested adding ferrite data line
radio frequency filters.

This reduced the level of radio

program recordings to less than 5% of the data collected.

A

second problem was finding a location away from air
conditioning units.

The sensor was moved twice to increase

distance from the units and reduce white noise.
Data Analysis

A survey design was used for the data collection of
interview information.

Originally, the plan was to evaluate

correlations .between the independent variable, recorded
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gunfire, and residents' reports of gu�fire.

The types of

statistical procedures used in this study were changed due
to the correlation between current and previous gunfire
recordings.

The observations of recorded gunfire were not

independent of each other.
The statistical procedures used to evaluate
relationships between recorded gunfire and residents'
responses involved the following steps:
1.

diagnosing the series of recorded gunfire for
autocorrelations and periodicity;

2.

identifying the model for the series of gunfire
recordings using the autoregressive integrated
moving average ( ARIMA) function;

3.

using the ARIMA function to determine variable
coefficients and levels of significance for the
independent and control variables.

ARIMA analyses were used to examine the relationships
between recorded gunfire and residents' reports of gunfire
for three different time frames: the 24 hours prior to the
interview, the hours between 5 : 01 p. m. and 12:00 a. m. , and
the hours between 12:01 a. m. and 5:00 a. m.

121

Pearson and Spearman' s rho correlations were used to
examine relationships between 9 11 data and residents'
responses.
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CHAPTER V
Results

The data from this study were analyzed and ordered
according to presence of gunfire, time of gunfire, patterns
of gunfire, and eme·rgency calls for help dealing with
gunfire.

Data from the interviews, ShotSpotter, and 911

emergency calls were analyzed for relationships among the
variables.

This indicated whether the data did or did not

support the hypotheses of this study.
For this study 342 people were interviewed by telephone
using the study questionnaire.

(See appendix A) .

A one

sensor ShotSpotter collected gunfire recordings for 119 days
in the two areas where the respondents lived.

The two

selected areas were identified by police crime reports as
having moderate difficulty with gunfire.
Presence of Gunfire

The dependent variable for this study was the number of
gunshots recorded by a ShotSpotter device.

Most of the

measures of independent variables were based on the
residents' responses to interview questions.
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ShotSpotter Data Results

The range of number of gunshots - recorded was from zero
to 65, with zero being the mode.

(See Table 6).

At the

first site (Area A), a police intervention occurred six days
after data collection began.

The gunfire activity almost

stopped ·completely in this area.

The day prior to the

increased police activity, 16 shots were recorded from 3:10
a. m. to 3:58 a. m.

Following the intervention very little

gunfire was recorded for the remaining 50 days of
ShotSpotter data collection in this area.

During the data

collection time frame, this area was targeted for economic
development with many funding sources included.

Also,

Habitat for Humanity began construction on two houses.

The

first ten days of gunfire recordings were not included due
to an excessive amount of missing data (76%).

Initial

missing data were due to getting everything to work at the
same time.

Then, due to the low variability in the range of

gunfire data from Area A, it was not possible to accurately
calculate correlations and ARIMA analyses from Area A data.
As indicated by Figure 6. 1, restriction of range was
not a problem in Area B.

Gunfire recording data from Area B

were used in computing ARIMA analyses and correlations with
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Table 6.

Gunfire
Counts
. 00
1 . 00

2 . 00
3 . 00

4 . 00
5 . 00
7 . 00
8 . 00

9 . 00
10 . 00

1 1 . 00
12 . 00

13 . 0 0
15 . 0 0

16 . 00
17 . 0 0

2 0 . 00
21 . 00

2 6 . 00
27 . 0 0
40 . 00
42 . 00

4 9 . 00
60 . 0 0
64 . 00
65 . 0 0

Total

Frequency Distribution of Daily Gunfire Counts

Fre�enc;t:
55
5

Cumulative
Percent

46.2
50 . 4

5
7

54 . 6
60 . 5

7
4

73 . 1

76. 5

1

79.0

6
2

2
4

3

1

2
1
1

1

65 . 5
67 . 2

78 . 2

82 . 4
84 . 9

85 . 7
87 . 4
88 . 2
89 . 1

1

89. 9
90 . 8

3

95 . 0

2
1
1

1
1

1
1
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92 . 4

95 . 8
96 . 6
97 . 5
98 . 3
99 . 2
100 . 0
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Number
of
Gunshots

Area B

70 . 00

60 . 00

Day Leading Drug
Dealer Sentenced

Area A

50 . 00

40 . 00

30 . 00

20 . 00

10 . 00

0 . 00

....
What is today ' s date?
m

Figure 6 . 1 Gunshots in Area A and Area B
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....
....
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independent - variables.

The second site (area B) had a

higher density of homes as well as a government housing
development.

From viewing media reports, there appeared to

be little economic interest in developing this area.

Crime

data seemed to indicate that the area had a more serious
gunfire problem.

Three weeks into recording data in area B,

gunfire activity appeared to substantially increase.

The

increase in numbers of gunshots began the day a few leading
people in the drug business were sentenced for lengthy
prison stays.

Since there were no controls or measures for

activity in the selected site, the gunfire increase could
In

have been due to many other factors not presently known.

addition, during two late night gunfire checks, the gunshots
appeared to be coming from a community park.

This differed

from views that the gunfire was primarily coming from areas
in the housing development.

Consistent with earlier

communication with residents, most shots seemed to be aimed
into the air, not at anything or anyone.

The late night

gunfire checks only occurred two nights and were therefore
not significant in terms of location.
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Patterns of Recorded Gunfire

Gunfire recordings were much more prevalent at night,
with 94. 5% of the gunfire recordings occurring at night, and
only 5. 5% recorded during the day.

Most of the shot

recordings occurred very late at night or in the very early
morning.

Most shots occurred in rapid succession, with

several shots being recorded in a small frame of time.

For

example, during one 24 hour span, 28 shots were recorded in
the seven minutes between 2 : 33 a. m. and 2 : 40 a. m.

As is

addressed below, gunfire recordings were more prevalent on
Saturday and Friday nights.

No gunfire was recorded during

rainy weather.
Interview Results

Of . the 342 people interviewed, 148 lived in area A and
194 in area B.

The respondents were randomly selected from

listings in the City Directory.

In the first sample, 139 of

the 148 respondents in area A lived in houses, and seven in
apartments.

In the second sample 8 5 of the 194 respondents

in area B lived in houses, and 103 in apartments.

A problem

with data collection was that the City Directory' s listings
were not representative of the community.
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The Directory

listed less than 10 phone numbers for people living in a
government housing development located in area B.

Of the

people interviewed, 97. 9% of the respondents had lived in
their homes for over three years and the remaining 2. 1% from
one to three years.

People who lived in their homes less

than three years were underrepresented in the sample.
Time of Day
Of the 340 people answering the question, "Do you ever
hear gunshots in your neighborhood, " 338 answered "yes, " and
only two answered "no. "

To get a better idea of whether

people heard gunshots during the traditional hours for
sleep, respondents were asked if gunfire ever bothered their
sleep.

Elev�n people (3. 3%) responded that gunfire had not

bothered their sleep, and 320 people (96. 7%) responded that
it had.

For the question asking the time of day when a

person was most likely to hear gunfire, 334 people said
"night" and only two responded "day. "

This was consistent

with the ShotSpotter data which indicated that 94. 5% of the
gunfire recordings occurred at night.

Many of the night

recordings also included multiple shots.

These results were

consistent with the hypothesis that a positive relationship

1 29

existed between recorded counts of gunfire and individuals'
reports of gunfire.
Day of Wee k
People were asked to identify the day of the week when
they were most likely to hear gunfire .

Even though asked

which "day" they heard the most gunfire, many people
responded with multiple days, most especially "Friday" and
"Saturday. "
70. 7%.

The most frequent response was Saturday, with

Table 7 summarizes subjects' responses.

This table

includes some multiple responses from persons, such as their
responses that they heard the most gunfire on Friday and
Saturday.

The responses from residents were consistent with

data recorded by ShotSpotter.

Shotspotter data also

indicated that there were more shot recordings on Saturday
than for any other day of the week.

The sum of ShotSpotter

recordings for each day of the week ranged from 38 shots on
Monday to 335 shots on Saturday, as shown in Table 8.
ShotSpotter data indicated the highest mean for Saturday, M
= 19. 71 (SD = 24. 69) .

Means for other days of the week were

Monday, M = 2. 37, (SD = 5. 10} ; Tuesday, M = 3. 60, (SD =
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Table 7.

Monday
2

Table 8 .
What is the
day of the
week?
Monday
Tuesday
Wednesday
Thursday
Friday
Saturday
Sunday

Which Day Do People Bear the Most Gunfire?

Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday
1

0

1

219

256

Sunday
11

ShotSpotter Recordings for Each Day of the Week

N

16

Minimum

. 00

Maximum

20 . 00

Sum

38 . 00

Mean

2 . 3750

S td .
Deviation

5 . 0 9 7 38

15

. 00

1 6 . 00

54 . 00

3 . 6000

5 . 52 656 ·

17

. 00

27 . 00

1 0 5 . 00

6 . 17 65

8 . 95988

16

. 00

27 . 00

95 . 0 0

5 . 9375

7 . 78 4 33

16

. 00

4 9 . 00

1 0 1 . 00

6 . 3125

1 3 . 1 1 8 53

17

. 00

65 . 00

3 35 . 00

1 9 . 7059

2 4 . 69252

17

. 00

21 . 00

8 5 . 00

5 . 0000

6 . 33 4 4 3
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5. 5 3) , Wednesday, M = 6. 18, (SD = 8 . 96) ; Thursday, M = 5. 93,
(SD = 7. 78) ; and Friday, M = 6. 31, (SD = 13. 12) .
In this study data from both the interviews and
SpotShotter indicated that Saturday was the day of the week
with the highest level of gunfire.

This was supportive of

the hypothesis that a positive relationship existed between
recorded counts of gunfire and individuals' reports of
gunfire.
Evaluation of Autocorrelations in the Dependent Variable

Before continuing to evaluate the relationship between
residents' reports of gunfire and recorded counts in Area B,
· a concern was that observations of the dependent variable,
recorded gunshots, were not independent of previous gunfire
recordings, i. e. , that the count data were autocorrelated.
An analysis of the autocorrelation structure in the
ShotSpotter data was conducted using procedures described by
Ostrom (1990) and McDowell, McCleary, Meidinger, and �ay
(1980) .

Of the 65 days of data collection in Area B, seven

days had missing data.

During those days, AM radio

frequency wave disruptions were a major problem.
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Then, a

connector on the adapted ShotSpotter laptop broke.

The

seven days of missing data occurred sequentially.
Diagnosis of Autocorrelations

The autocorrelation function was estimated using SPSS.
The plot for this function is shown in Figure 6. 2 .

The

autocorrelation function showed significant spikes at days
seven (. 271) and 21 (. 321) .

These residuals suggested a

seasonal autocorrelation with a seven-day periodicity (AR
seasonal) component (Ostrom, 1990) .
Identifying the Autocorrelation Model

Following Ostrom (1990) and McDowell, et al. , (1980) ,
an ARIMA (0, 0, 0) (3, 0, 0) model was tried to describe
mathematically the process generating the autocorrelations.
(See Table 9) .

As indicated in Figure 6. 3 the use of the

seven-day periodicity (AR seasonal) component appeared to
account for the seven-day cycles .

As seen in Table 9, the

results of fitting an ARIMA (0, 0, 0) (3, 0, 0) model indicated
that a lag three (SAR3) seasonal autocorrelation was
statistically significant .

The residuals analysis suggested

that an ARIMA (0, 0, 0, ) (3, 0, 0) model appeared to specify the
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Res iduals for 2 4 Hours o f Gunshots
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Figure 6 . 2 . Recorded Gunfire Autocorrelations
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Residuals for 2 4 Hours of Gunshots· with ARIMA
( 0 , 0 , 0 ) (3 , 0 , 0)
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Figure 6. 3

Autocorrelations for Recorded Gunfire ARIMA

(0 , 0 , 0 ) (3 , 0 , 0 )
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Table 9 .

ARIMA 1 :

Model for Recorded Gunfire

(0,0,0) (3,0,0)

Model Descript ion :
Recorded Gunshots in Area B
Variable :
Regressors : None
Length of Seasonal Cycle : 7
Number of res iduals :

58

Variables i n the Mode l :
B
SARl
SAR2
SAR3
CONSTANT

. 238211
- . 031 6 3 5
. 4 7 64 0 3
1 1 . 93 4 7 1 2

SEB
. 1 2 0 60 4 5
. 13 1 8 4 82
. 17 6 4 15 4
3 . 65 5 9 64 8

T-RATIO
1 . 97 5 1 4 5 5
- . 2 3 9938 6
2 . 7 0 0 4 5 93
3 . 264 4 4 94

APPROX . PROB .
. 05 3 2 7 9 0 8
. 8 1 1 2 69 8 5
. 00918451
. 00188944

Unstandardi zed coe fficients for variables , B and unstandardi zed
coefficients for estimated standard errors , -SEB ; seasonal
autocorrelation lag 1 , SARl ; seasonal autocorrelation lag 2 , SAR2 ;
seasonal autocorrelation lag 3 , SAR3 ; e < . 05 , two-tailed .

nature of the relationships between error terms.

With the

parameters of the recorded gunshots errors estimated, the
relationships between recorded gunfire and residents'
responses were analyzed.
Presence of Gunfire in the Las t 2 4 Hours

Residents identified a general presence of gunfire, the
time of day when gunfire was more likely, and the day of the
week when gunfire was more prevalent.

ARIMA analyses were

conducted to further test the relationship between
13 6

residents' responses regarding gunfire and recorded gunfire
during three time frames:
morning.

daily, night time, and early

Daily count was defined as the total number of

recordings within the 24-hour interview time frame.

Night

time shots were defined as between 5:01 p. m. and 12:00 a. m.
Early morning shots were defined as the total recorded
between 12:01 a. m. and 5:00 a. m.

An interview day was

defined as the 24 hours prior to the resident's interview.
Additional ARIMA analyses were conducted with weather
variables that might potentially impact the amount of
gunfire.

Consistent with the original hypothesis stating

that a positive relationship existed between recorded counts
of gunfire and residents' responses, a directional
hypothesis test was used to indicate statistical
significance.

The analyses between weather variables and

recorded gunfire were nondirectional since either positive
or negative results could be informative.

With the ARIMA

(0, 0, 0) (3, 0, 0) autocorrelation function controlling for the
seven day periodicity, the following ARIMA analyses were
conducted:
ARIMA 2.

DV:

Area B gunfire recordings

IV:

Average number of gunshots reported by
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residents
IV:

Percentage of residents reporting the
presence of gunfire;

ARIMA 3.

DV:

Area B gunfire recordings

IV:

Low temperature

IV:

High temperature

IV:

Precipitation-

The results from ARIMA 2 indicated that people' s
reports of gunfire in the last 24 hours were not
statistically significant.

When controlling for seasonal

autocorrelations, numbers of gunshots reported by residents
did not appear valid (i. e. � = -. 300,
one-tailed) .

!

= -. 129, E > . 05,

When controlling for seasonal

autocorrelations, the percentage of people reporting the
presence of gunfire also did not appear valid (i. e. � =
. 067, t = . 928, E > . 05, one-tailed) .

For the 24-hour time

frame, residents' reports did not appear to be valid
indicators of recorded gunfire.

(See Table 10) .

Similarly, for the 24 hour time frame, none of the
weather variables were considered statistically significant
indicators of recorded gunfire (e < . 05) .
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(See Table 11) .

Table 1 0 . ARIMA 2 :
Responses (N = 58)

Gunshots During 2 4 Hours and Residents'

Variables in the Model :
B
SARl
SAR2
SAR3
avereport
% hearing
CONSTANT

. 2 2 97 7 9 6
- . 0208277
. 4 62 65 2 8
- . 2 9 952 92
. 0 6 6 8 92 2
9 . 5 8 4 7 17 7

SEB
. 12 5 95 4 6
. 1367420
. 1 8 8 97 92
2 . 3131764
. 07 2 0 7 98
4 . 2 2 9 63 3 4

T - RAT IO
1 . 8 2 4 30 4 0
- . 1 52 3 1 3 8
2 . 4 4 8 1 67 4
- . 12 948 8 3
. 92 8 02 8 9
2 . 2 66087 1

APPROX . PROB .
. 0 7 38 5 4 1 6
. 8 7 95 2 8 9 1
. 0 1 7 7 6 90 9
. 8 97 4 7 0 8 9
. 3 5 7 6 8 0 37
. 02763568

Unstandardi zed coeffi cient s for variables , B and unstandardized
coe fficients for est imated standard errors , -SEB; seasonal
autocorrelation lag 1 , SARl ; s easonal autocorrelation
lag 2 , SAR2 ; seasonal autocorrelat ion lag 3 , SAR3 ; e < . 0 5 , one - tailed .

Table 1 1 . ARIMA 3 :
Variables (N•58)

Gunshots During 2 4 Hours and Weather

Variables in the Model :
B
SARl
SAR2
SAR3
hightemp
lowtemp
rain
CONSTANT

. 24 6433
- . 0 4 38 1 2
. 34 7 8 7 4
- . 296424
. 3 4 67 8 8
-10 . 03007 9
17 . 2 7 1 67 7

SEB
. 159800
. 1 62 8 5 8
. 2 03 5 4 9
. 4 228 08
. 4 05503
5 . 0 62 2 4 3
22 . 64 2 62 9

T - RAT IO

APPROX . PROB .

1 . 5 4 2 134 9
- . 2 690172
1 . 70904 42
- . 7 0 10853
. 8552047
-1 . 98 13508
. 7 62 7 9 4 7

. 1 2 93 4 6 68
. 7 8 9023 4 3
. 09364374
. 4 8 64 9 9 9 9
. 39651738
. 05306433
. 4 4 9 1 6 97 8

Unstandardi zed coef fi cient s for variables , B and unstandardi zed
coe fficient s for estimated standard errors , -SEB; seasonal
autocorrelat ion lag 1 , SARl ; s easonal aut ocorrelation
lag 2 , SAR2 ; seasonal autocorrelation lag 3, SAR3 ; e < . 0 5 , two - t ailed .
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For the 24 hour time frame, weather variables were not
considered reliable predictors of gunfire for the entire
day.
Identification of Night Recorded Gunfire Counts

The pattern of autocorrelations for night gunfire was
similar to the patterns for the 24-hour time frame of
The autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation

gunfire.

functions identified statistically significant seasonal
autocorrelations at lags two and three (see Figures 6. 4 and
6. 5) .

As with the 24-hour time frame of gunfire

recordings, periodicity was seven days.
suggested an ARIMA (0, 0, 0) (3, 0, 0) model.
fitting this model are shown in Table 12.

These results
The results of
Using this ARIMA

model for night recorded gunfire the Box Ljung statistics
for the ACF function were statistically nonsignificant for
all lags.

As seen in Table 12, the lag two (SAR2) and lag

three (SAR3) seasonal autocorrelations were statistically
significant (E < . 05, two-tailed) .

The ARIMA

(0, 0, 0) (3, 0, 0) model appeared to account for the process
generating the errors for night-recorded gunfire.
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Residuals for Night Recorded Gunfire
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Figure 6 . 4

Autocorrelations for Night Gunfire
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Residuals for Night Recorded Gunfire
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Figure 6 . 5 Partial Autocorrelations for Night Gunfire
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Table 12 .
Model

ARIMA 4 :

Night Gunshots ( 0 , 0 , 0 ) ( 3 , 0 , 0 )

Model Description :
Variable :

gunshot s recorded during night ( 5 : 0 1 p . m . to 12 : 0 0 a . rn .

Length o f Seasonal Cycle : 7 days
B

SEB

T-RATIO

APPROX . PROB .

Variables in the Model :
SARl
SAR2
SAR3
CONSTANT

. 05 9 1 1 4 2
. 3 1 5 5 97 8
. 3 92 0 4 3 8
6 . 30 9 9 8 4 5

. 13 2 8 2 2 7
. 13 1 62 1 1
. 17 7 0 17 0
2 . 5964872

. 4 4 50 60 9
2 . 3 97 7 7 4 3
2 . 2147242
2 . 4 302005

. 65 8 022 4 3
. 0 1 9 9 1 673
. 0 3 0 94 0 4 7
. 0 1 8 3 8 0 94

Unstandardi zed coefficients for variable s , B and unstandardi zed
coefficient s for estimated standard errors , -SEB ; seasonal
autocorrelation lag 1 , SARl ; seasonal autocorrelation
lag 2 , SAR2 ; seasonal autocorrelation lag 3 , SAR3 ; e < . 05 , two-tai led .

As indicated by Figures 6. 6 and 6. 7, the ARIMA
(0, 0, 0) (3, 0, 0) model appeared to account for the errors
generated by the seasonal autocorrelations.
Gunfire Between 5 : 0 1 p . m . and 12 : 0 0 a . m .

ShotSpotter recordings indicated that 5 3. 14% of the
total recorded gunshots for a day occurred between 5: 01
p. m. and 12:00 a. m. (M = 3. 8 1, SD = 7. 80) .

It was predicted

that people's reports of gunfire might be related to the
time of day the shots were recorded.

To further clarify the
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Residuals for Night Gunshots ARIMA (0, 0, 0 )
(3 , 0 , 0)
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Figure 6. 6 Autocorrelations for Night Recorded Gunfire
ARDfA ( 0 , 0 , 0 ) ( 3 , 0 , 0 )
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Residua1s for Night Gunshots ARDm. ( O , O , O )
( 3, 0 , 0 )
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Figure 6. 7 Partia1 Autocorrelations for Night Recorded
Gunfire ( 0 , 0 , 0) (3, 0 , 0 )
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recorded counts of gunfire, the following two analyses were
relationship between residents' responses about gunfire and
The dependent variable was recorded gunshots

conducted.

occurring between 5:01 p. m. and 1 2:00 a. m.

The independent

variables of interest were residents' reports about gunfire
in the last 24 hours.

In keeping with the hypothesis that a

positive relationship existed between residents' responses
and recorded gunfire , directional hypotheses were tested.
With the ARIMA (0, 0, 0) (3, 0, 0) function controlling for the 7
day periodicity, the following ARIMA analyses were
conducted:
ARIMA 5.

DV:

Area B night gunfire recordings

IV:

Average number of gunshots reported by
residents;

ARIMA 6.

DV:

Area B night gunfire recordings

IV:

Percentage of residents reporting the
presence of gunfire;

ARIMA 7.

ARIMA 8.
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DV:

Area B night gunfire recordings

IV:

Low temperature

IV:

High temperature

IV:

Precipitation

DV:

Area B night gunfire recordings

IV:

Percentage of residents reporting the
presence of gunfire

IV:

High temperature

IV:

Precipitation-

Results from ARIMA 5 are shown in Table 13.

As

indicated, the relationship between the average number of
gunshots reported and ShotSpotter counts did not appear
statistically significant.

When controlling for seasonal

autocorrelations, the average number of gunshots reported by
residents did not appear to be a valid predictor of the
number of gunshots recorded (� = 1. 72, t = 1. 70, E > . OS,
one-tailed) .
The results from ARIMA 6 indicated that the percentage
of persons reporting the presence of gunfire was a
statistically significant predictor of the presence of night
gunshots.

When controlling for seasonal autocorrelations,

the percentage of people reporting the presence of gunfire
appeared to be a valid predictor of the presence of night
gunfire (i. e. � = . 070,

! = 2. 28, E < . 05, one-tailed) .

(See Table 14) .
For · the hours between 5:01 p. m. and 12:00 a. m. , the
absence of precipitation appeared to be a statistically
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Table 13 .

ARIMA 5 :

Average Gunshots Reported (N

=

58)

Variables in the Model :
Dependent variable : Gunshots recorded during night ( 5 : 0 1 p . m . to
12 : 00 a . m . )
B
SARl
SAR2
SAR3
ave report
CONSTANT

. 0990359
. 30 3 3 4 9 1
. 35 3 4 4 3 1
1 . 7 1 90 4 2 2
5 . 5417319

SEB
. 1 4 7 1 1 33
. 1401459
. 1 9 8 66 2 3
1 . 0 1 1 1 3 60
2 . 623 1 1 97

T-RATIO
. 67 3 1 9 4 6
2 . 1 64 52 3 0
1 . 7 7 91 1 5 5
1 . 7 0 0 1 0 97
2 . 1 12 64 93

APPROX . PROB .
. 5 0 3 8 0 4 60
. 03 5 0 3 7 2 5
. 0 8 10 65 9 4
. 0 9 5 0 8 4 94
. 03 9 4 5 0 8 2

Unstandardi zed coefficients for variable s , B and uns tandardi zed
coefficients for estimated s tandard errors , -SEB ; seasonal
autocorrelation lag 1, SARl ; seasonal autocorre lation lag 2, SAR2 ;
seasonal autocorrelation lag 3 , SAR3 ; E < . 0 5 , one-tailed .

Table 1 4 . ARIMA 6 :
Present (N
58)

Percentage of People Reporting Gunfire

Variables in t he Model :
Dependent variable : Gunshots recorded during night ( 5 : 0 1 p . m . to
12 : 0 0 . a . m . )
B
SARl
SAR2
SAR3
% hearing
CONSTANT

. 0857177
. 2 7 7 334 1
. 4068705
. 0698 68 1
3 . 7 94 8 022

SEB
. 13 2 0 9 0 5
. 132934 8
. 17 4 3 6 61
. 0 3062 64
2 . 8077974

T-RATIO
. 64 8 93 1 5
2 . 0 8 62 4 0 9
2 . 333 4 2 6 6
2 . 2 8 1 30 5 6
1. 3515228

APPROX . PROB .
. 51918482
. 04 17 8 4 94
. 02 34 5 1 8 7
. 02 65 7 5 6 1
. 1 8 2 2 6 8 62

Unstandardi zed coefficients for variables , B and unstandardi zed
coefficients for estimated s tandard errors , -SEB ; seasonal
autocorrelation lag 1, SARl ; s easonal autocorrelation
lag 2 , SAR2 ; seasonal autocorrelation lag 3, SAR3 ; E < . 0 5 , one-tailed .
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significant predictor of recorded night gunfire (i. e.
B = -6. 63,

!

= -2. 34, E < . 05, two-tailed) .

(See Table 15) .

The ARIMA 8 analysis further examined the percentage of
people reporting the presence of gunfire when controlling
for seasonal autocorrelations, high temperature, and
precipitation.

The percentage of people reporting the

presence of gunfire was again statistically significant
(i. e. � = . 08 7, t = 2. 78, E < . 05) .

As indicated by Tables

14 and 16, regardless of what independent variables were
included in the model, the percentage of residents reporting
Table 15. ARIMA 7 :
Gunfire (N = 58)

Weather Variables and Night Recorded

Variables in the Model :
Dependent variable : Gunshot s recorded during night ( 5 : 0 1 p . m . to 1 2 : 0 0
a.m. }
B

SARl
SAR2
SAR3
lowtemp
hightemp
rain
CONS TANT

. 1 4 90 8 9
. 3 1 5 6 68
. 247310
. 203014
- . 379915
- 6 . 62 5 9 4 5
2 6 . 739945

SEB
. 150121
. 1 4 8 66 9
. 1 97 9 8 3
. 2 3 1 32 6
. 245049
2 . 834452
13 . 101247

T-RAT IO
. 9 93 1 22 4
2 . 1 2 32 90 1
1 . 2 4 91 4 8 3
. 8 7 7 6 07 6
-1 . 5503614
-2 . 3 37 6 4 5 8
2 . 04 1022 9

APPROX . PROB .
. 32 5 4 3 2 3 5
. 03870161
. 2 1742731
. 38 4 35429
. 12 7 3 6 1 9 5
. 02 3 4 4 8 9 4
. 0 4 65 4 4 8 1

Unstandardi zed coefficient s for variables , B and unstandardi zed
coefficients for estimated standard errors , -SEB ; seasonal
autocorrelation lag 1 , SARl ; seasonal autocorrelation
lag 2 , SAR2 ; seasonal autocorrelat ion lag 3, SAR3 ; p �. 0 5 , two-tailed .
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'l'ab1e 1 6 . ARIMA 8 : Percentage of Peop1e Reporting Gunfire
Present and Weather Variab1es {N = 5 8)

Variables in the Model :
SARl
SAR2
SAR3
hightem
rain
% hearing
CONSTANT

B

SEB

T-RATIO

APPROX . PROB .

. 195968
. 27 1 1 4 4
. 2 4 8 68 8
- . 27 8 57 4
-5 . 3 4 9 4 4 9
. 0 8 6 95 6
27 . 5 8 1 5 7 2

. 1 65 1 5 2
. 15 4 7 17
. 208086
. 14 9 9 5 8
2 . 2 98 9 6 1
. 03 1230
12 . 4 12727

1 . 1 8 65 8 9 8
1 . 7525240
1 . 1 95 12 2 4
-1 . 8 5 7 68 4 0
-2 . 32 6 8 98 8
2 . 7 8 4 35 4 2
2 . 2220398

. 2 4 1 1 10 8 9
. 0 8 5 9392 6
. 2377 9 1 6 4
. 0 6922 8 2 3
. 02 4 1 4 7 7 0
. 0 0 7 60 1 4 8
. 03092951

* Unstandardi zed coefficients for variables , � and uns tandardi zed
coefficients for estimated standard errors , SEB ; seasonal
autocorrelation lag 1 , SARl ; seasonal autocorrelation
lag 2 , SAR2 ; seasonal autocorrelation lag 3 , SAR3 ; p � . 0 5 , two-tailed .

the presence of night gunfire remained statistically
significant.

In addition, the independent variable,

percentage of people reporting the presence of gunfire,
seemed relatively insensitive to the autocorrelation
structure of night recorded gunfire.

For example, analyses

computed with an ARIMA (5, 1, 1) (3, 0, 0) model were also
statistically significant (p < . 05) .

The percentage of

residents reporting the presence of gunfire appeared to be a
robust predictor of the presence of night gunfire.
The weather variable, absence of precipitation, again
appeared to be a predictor of recorded gunshots (B
t = -2. 33, p < . 05) .
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The variables high and low

-5. 35,

temperatures were probably influenced by the time of year
data were collected.

The 59 nights of data collection

occurred during late spring and early summer.

Many

replications of this and similar studies are needed to
better understand the predictive value of different weather
variables in different locations
The assumption of independence of observations was
addressed by the ARIMA (0, 0, 0)

(3, 0, 0) function controlling

for seasonal autocorrelations as indicated by Figures 6. 6
and 6. 7.

In addition, the Durbin-Watson statistic was 1. 9

suggesting that independence of observations concerns were
sufficiently addressed by the ARIMA (0, 0, 0) (3, 0, 0) model.
The assumption of a normal distribution of residuals was
supported by the Kolmogorov Smirnov test, as did the Q-Q
plot, which appeared linear.

(See Table 17 and Figure 6. 8 ) .

The time sequence plot indicated that the variance of the Y
score was relatively uniform for values of X as indicated by
Figure 6. 9.

The assumption of homoscedasticity did not

appear to be substantially violated.
To further examine the relationships between the
dependent variables, Area B night recorded gunfire, and
independent variables, Pearson Correlations and Spearman's

15 1

Normal Q-Q Plot of Res idual s for Night
Gunshots ARIMA ( 0 , 0 , 0 ) ( 3 , 0 , 0 )
20
0
0
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-20 -+-----------------------------"
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20
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Observed Value

Figure 6 . 8 Q-Q Plot of Night Recorded Gunshots ARIMA
(0,0 ,0) (3, 0,0)
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Figure 6 . 9 Time Sequence Plot for Residuals of Night
Recorded Gunfire
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Table 17. Kolmogorav-Smirnov Test for Normal Distribution
of Night Recorded Gunfire Residuals

Normal
Parameters
( a , b)
Most Extreme
Di fferences

Mean
Std . Deviat ion

Absolute
Pos itive
Negative
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z
Asymp . Sig . ( 2 -tai led )
Exact Sig . ( 2-tailed )
Point Probabi lity

a
b

Test dist ribut ion is Normal .
Calculated from data .

Residuals
for Night
Recorded
Gunfire
. 6128388
7 . 0263435
9
. 142
. 142
- . 070
1 . 066
. 206
. 319
. 000

rho Correlations were computed.

Since the raw ShotSpotter

data used in the correlations contained autocorrelations,
only the parameter estimates were considered unbiased.

The

tests of statistical significance were considered to be
seriously
affected by the autocorrelation structure of the recorded
gunfire data.
As indicated by Table 18, the Pearson Correlation
parameter for average number of gunshots recorded and night
recorded gunfire was . 298.
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The parameter for the percentage

Table 1 8 . Pearson Correlations between Area B Night
Recorded Gunfire and Residents' Reports of Gunshots

How many
gunshot s were
recorded for
the interview
night ?
What is the
average number
of shot s
reported for
the day?

Pearson
Correlation

How many
gunshot s
were
recorded
for the
interview
night ?

Sig . ( 1 -tailed)
N
Pearson
Correlation
Sig . ( 1 -tailed)

N

What percentage Pearson
of resident s
Correlation
reported the
presence of
gunshots ?
Sig . ( 1 -tailed)
N

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (I-tailed).

1

59

. 2 98 ( * )

. 012
57
. 34 9 { * )

. 004
58
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of people reporting the presence of gunfire was . 34 9.

The

tests of statistical significance indicated that both
correlations were statistically significant, but the .
autoco�relation structure of the data made those results
questionable.
The Spearman's rho correlation indicated that the
parameter for average number of gunshots reported was . 17 2.
The Spearman's rho parameter for the percentage of people
· reporting the presence of gunfire was . 207.

Neither

correlation was considered statistically significant.

(See

Table 19) .
As indicated in Table 20, the Pearson correlation
between Area B night-recorded gunfire and weather indicated
that the parameter for high temperature was -. 04 1 and the
parameter for low temperature was -. 058 .

The parameter for

precipitation was -. 345 and was considered statistically
significant.

The Spearman's rho correlation parameter for

high temperature was -. 002 and the parameter for low
temperature was -. 107 (see Table 21) .

The parameter for

precipitation was -. 444 and was considered statistically
significant.
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Again, all of the correlation tests of

Tab1e 1 9 . Spearman' s rho Correlations between Area B Night
Recorded Gunfire and Residents' Reports of Gunshots

Spearman ' s rho How many
gunshots were
recorded for
the interview
night ?

Correlation
Coe fficient
Sig . ( 1tai led )

N

What is the
Correlat ion
average number Coe fficient
of shots
reported for
the day?
Sig . ( 1tailed)
What
percentage of
res idents
report ed the
pre sence o f
gunshots ?

N

Correlat i on
Coef ficient

Sig . ( 1tailed)
N

How many
gunshots
were
recorded
for the
interview
night ?
1 . 000

59
. 172

. 1 00
57

. 207
. 0 60
58
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Table 2 0 . Pearson Correlations between Area B Night
Recorded Gunfire and Weather Variables

How many
gunshots were
recorded for
the interview
night ?
What is the
high
temperature
for the day?
What is the
low
temperature
for the day?

Pearson
Correlation
Sig . ( 2 tailed)

N

Pearson
Correlation
Sig . ( 2 tailed)

N

Pearson
Correlation
Sig . ( 2 tailed)
N

Was
precipitation
presence
during the
interview
time?

Pearson
Correlation

Sig . ( 2 tailed)

N

How many
gunshots
were
recorded
for the
interview
ni2ht ?
1

59
- . 04 1
. 7 65
57

- . 058
. 6 67
57
- . 345 ( * * )
. 00 7

59

* * Correlation i s signi ficant at the 0 . 0 1 level ( 2 - tailed) .
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Table 2 1 . Spearman ' s rho Correlations between Area B Night
Recorded Gunfire and Weather Variables

Spearman ' s
rho

How many
gunshots were
recorded for
the interview
night ?

Correlation
Coe fficient
Sig . ( 2 taile d )

N

What is the
high
temperature
for the day?

Correlat ion
Coe fficient
Sig . ( 2 tailed)
N

What is the
low
temperature
for the day?

Was
precipitat ion
presence
during the
interview
time ?

Correlat ion
Coe fficient
Sig . ( 2 tailed )
N
Correl ation
Coe fficient

Sig . ( 2 tailed )
N

**

How many
gunshots
were
recorded
for the
interview
night ?
1 . 00 0

59

- . 002
. 98 7
57
- . 107

. 4 27
57

- . 444 { ** )
. 000
59

Correlat ion i s significant at the 0 . 0 1 level ( 2 - tailed ) .
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statistical significance should be regarded with much
caution due to the autocorrelation structure of the recorded
gunfire data.
Identification of the Early Morning Recorded Gunfire Counts

In order to examine the relationships between
residents' reports of gunfire and gunfire recorded during
the early morning hours (12:01 a. m. to 5:00 a. m. ) , a
diagnosis of the dependent variable for autocorrelations was
needed.

The patterns of autocorrelations for the early

morning gunfire were very different from the gunshot
patterns for night-time and 24 hour time frames.

As

indicated in Figures 6. 10 and 6. 11, the autocorrelation and
partial autocorrelation functions indicated a lag one
autocorrelation.

As suggested by the residual analysis, the

results of which are shown in Figures 6. 12 and 6. 13, the
autocorrelations could be adequately modeled with an ARIMA
(1, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) model.

The lag one autocorrelation (ARl ) in

ARIMA (1, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) was considered statistically
significant (p < . 05) .
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(See Table 22) .

Bow many gunshots were recorded during the very
early morning ( 12 : 01 a. m. to 5 : 00 a. m. ) ?
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Figure 6. 10
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Autocorrelations for Early Morning Recorded
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Bow many gunshots were recorded during the very
early morning ( 12 : 01 a. m. to 5:00 a. m. ) ?
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Figure 6. 11 Partial Autocorrelations for Early Morning
Recorded Gunfire
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Residuals for Early Morning Gunshots ARIMA
(1 , 0 , 0) (0 , 0 , 0)
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Figure 6. 12
Autocorrelations for Ear1y Morning Recorded
Gunfire ARIMA ( 1 , 0 , 0 ) ( 0 , 0 , 0 ) Nod.el
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Residuals for Early Morning Gunshots ARIMA
(1 , 0 , 0) (0 , 0 , 0)
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Figure 6. 1 3 Partial Autocorrelations for Early Morning
Recorded Gunfire ARIMA ( 1 , 0 , 0 ) ( 0 , 0 , 0 ) Model
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Table 22 .
(N • 60)

ARIMA Model for Morning Gunshots ( 1 , 0 , 0 ) ( 0 , 0 , 0 )

Model Description :
Variable :
a.m. }

gunshots recorded during early morning ( 12 : 01 a . m . to 5 : 00

No seasonal component in model .
Variables in the Model :

ARl
CONSTANT

B

SEB

T-RATIO

APPROX . PROB .

. 2 8 272 92
5 ."63 8 2 5 62

. 12 5 9522
1 . 6 8 5 7 98 7

2 . 2447342
3 . 3 4 4 5 607

. 02 8 614 2 2
. 0014 4 914

Unstandardized coefficients for vari able s , B and uns tandardi zed
coe f ficients for estimated standard errors , -SEB
- ; autocorrelation lag 1 ,
(ARl } ; p � . 0 5 , two-tai l ed .

Gunfire Between 12 : 01 a . m . and 5 : 00 a . m .

During the data col lection time frame, ShotSpotter
recordings indicated that 45. 20% of the total recorded
gunshots occurred between 12:01 a. m. and 5:00 a. m. (� = 3,
1 8, SD = 7 . 7 3) .

I t was predicted that the validity of

people's reports might be affected by the time of day
gunshots were recorded.

To further examine the relationship

between residents' responses about early morning gunfire and
recorded counts of gunfire, the following analyses were
conducted.

The dependent variable was the total recorded
165

gunshots occurring between 12:01 a. m. and 5:00 a. m.

The

independent variables were residents' reports about gunfire
in the last 24 hours.

With the ARIMA function controlling

for autocorrelations, the following ARIMA analyses were
conducted:
ARIMA 10.

DV:

Area B early morning gunfire recordings

IV:

Average number of gunshots reported by
residents;

ARIMA 11.

DV:

Area B early morning gunfire recordings

IV:

Percentage of residents reporting the
presence of gunfire;

ARIMA 12.

DV:

Area B early morning gunfire recordings

IV:

High temperature

IV:

Low temperature

IV:

Precipitation-

As indicated in Tables 23 and 24, residents ' reports
were not statistically significant predictors of early
morning gunshots.

When controlling for autocorrelations,

gunshot numbers reported by residents were not valid
predictors of morning gunfire (i. e. B
. 05, one-tailed) .

-. 06,

! = -. 043, e >

When controlling for autocorrelations,

the percentage of peopl e reporting the presence of gunfire,
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Tabla 2 3 .

ARIMA 10 :

Early Morning

( N =5 9 )

Variables in the Model :
Dependent variable : gunshots recorded during early morning ( 12 : 0 1 a . m .
to 5 : 00 a .m. )
SEB

B
ARl

ave report
CONSTANT

. 2 684780
- . 0 5 91 2 8 7
5 . 8 2 4 37 0 3

. 13 0 1 3 7 6
1 . 3837 685
1 . 9 15 3 4 8 2

T-RATIO

APPROX . PROB .

2 . 0 63 03 1 9
- . 0 4 2 7 3 02
3 . 0 4 08937

. 0 4 3 8 4 32 0
. 9 6 607 1 3 9
. 00 3 6 0 8 9 4

Unstandardi zed coefficients for variables , B and uns tandardi zed
coe fficients for estimated s tandard e rrors , -SEB
- ; autocorrelation lag 1 ,
(ARl ) ; p � . 0 5 , one-tailed .
-

Tabla 2 4 .

ARIMA 1 1 :

Early Morning

(N =5 9 )

Variables in the Model :
Dependent variable : gunshots recorded during early morning ( 12 : 0 1 a . m .
to 5 : 0 0 a . m . )
Variables in the Model :
B

ARl
percent
CONSTANT

. 2 7 8 2 6 62
. 0000542
5 . 7 32 0 8 6 9

SEB
. 12 8 7 6 1 2
. 0 4 0 2 12 8
2 . 2 9 4 6022

T-RATIO
2 . 1611029
. 00 1 3 4 67
2 . 4 98 0 7 4 4

APPROX . PROB .
. 0 3 4 97 8 9 6
. 998 93030
. 01545011

Unstandardi zed coefficients for variables , B and unstandardized
coefficient s for estimated standard errors , -SEB
-- ; autocorrelation lag 1 ,
(ARl ) ; p � . 05 , one-tailed .
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did not appear to be a valid predictor of the presence of
early morning recorded gunshots (i. e. B = . 0001, t = . 001,
p > . 05, one-tailed) .

Neither xesidents' reports of the

number of gunshots Q� the percentages of persons reporting
the presence of gunfire were valid indicators of early
morning gunfire recordings.
Perhaps the lack of validity for residents identifying
the presence of gunfire in early morning was due to
traditional sleep patterns.

Most people were perhaps

sleeping between 12:01 a. m. and 5:00 a. m.

As indicated by

Figure 6. 14, gunfire appeared to be a problem for some early
morning time frames.

Perhaps questions indicating the

presence. of early morning gunfire should include references
to patterns of sleep and gunshot disturbances of sleep.

As

a general question, 96. 7% of the respondents did indicate
that gunfire had bothered their sleep.

The relationships of

these sleep disturbances to early morning gunshots were not
addressed in this study.
The direction of this study was to evaluate the
validity of residents' gunfire reports when compared with
gunfire recordings for a particular day.

Other factors that

perhaps impacted the validity of responses included the
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residents' proximity to the source of the gunfire, how aware
individuals were of sounds while sleeping, and the number of
hours individual spent . in the home.

The responses . from some

subsets of the population of residents may have had greater
validity than the responses from other subsets within the
population.
The ARIMA weather analysis indicated that absence of
precipitation appeared to be a predictor of recorded
gunshots (B = -8.13, t = -2.43, p < .05) .

As indicated in

Table 25, the variables of high and low temperatures
appeared statistically nonsignificant.

It would be

interesting to compare those results with weather analyses
from times of the year with more extreme temperature
readings.

The high temperature for the data collection time

frame had a mean of 8 1.9, median of 8 2, and mode of 8 2.

The

low temperatures had a mean of 62.97, median of 64, and mode
of 67 .
Table 2 5 .
(N =58)

ARIMA 12 :

Early Morning Gunfire and Weather

Variables in the Model :
ARl
lowtemp
hightemp
rain
CONSTANT

17 0

B

SEB

T-RAT I O

APPROX . PROB .

. 2 7 1 1 93
. 35 0 1 61
. 022456
- 8 . 128 6 94
- 1 5 . 6 6 3577

. 1 3 37 8 4
. 3 0 9 64 8
. 33 2 2 6 1
3 . 34 4 6 8 3
1 9 . 581402

2 . 0 2 7 0 95 5
1 . 1 3 0 8 377
. 0 67 5 8 4 8
- 2 . 4 3 03330
- . 7 9 9 92 1 1

. 0 4 7 6 95 5 3
. 2 632 1 4 7 5
. 9 4 6 37 0 4 7
. 0 1850331
. 4 2 7 32 7 37

Emergency Calls for Help

Emergency calls to the Emergency Management Center for
gun related concerns and assaults totaled 57 calls.

The

calls for gun related concerns followed a very clear
pattern: they occurred only when a person was shot or in
danger of being shot, or when personal property was being
damaged.
distance.

There were no calls for hearing gunfire in the
In addition, calls were not made to report

someone randomly shooting into the sky.

There were calls

from ·1ocations outside of Area A and Area B about hearing
random gunfire.

Those locations did not appear to have a

history of moderate gunfire activity.
There were 13 calls reporting that someone had been
shot or was being shot at, or that personal property was
being damaged by someone' s shooting.

The information

available to the public from emergency calls was very
limited.

Details regarding what happened at the locations

reporting gunfire were not available.

The hypotheses were

made that 911 calls about gunfire would correlate to
individual reports of gunfire and to recorded counts of
gunfire.

As indicated in Table 26, the results from two

tailed Pearson and Spearman' s rho correlation analyses
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Table 2 6 . Relationship of Recorded Gunfire and 911 Calls
for Gunfire (Two-tailed)

Pearson
Correlation
For thi s day,
how many 9 1 1
calls for
' gunshots were
received?
Sig . ( 2-tai led )
N

How many
gunshots were
I recorded for the
interview night ?
- . 154
. 245

59

I

- -

How many gunshots
were recorded for I
the interview
Spea rman ' s rho
night ?
For t his day,
how many 9 1 1
1 calls for
- . 196 ; I
, gunshots were
received?
; s ig . { 2 . 1 37
tailed)
N

--

172

59

indicated no statistically significant relationship between
911 calls regarding gunfire and recorded gunfire.

Again,

correlations were only computed for Area B due to the lack
of vari�bility in Area A.
Another hypothesis of the study was that residents'
reports of gunfire would have a higher correlation with
gunfire than with 911 gunfire calls.

As indicated in Table

27, resident reports appeared to have a statistically
significant Pearson correlation with recorded gunfire (p <
. 05) , but not with 911 gunfire calls {p > . 05) .

Neither

residents' reports nor 911 gunfire calls had a statistically
significant Spearrnan's rho correlation (p < . 05) .

Due to

the autocorrelations in the recorded gunfire data, tests of
significance could be seriously biased.

The possibility of

Type I errors increased with positive autocorrelations and
the possibility of Type II errors increased with negative
autocorrelations.

Pearson correlation parameters for

variables were 911 gunfire calls, -. 154 ; percentage of
residents reporting the presence of gunfire, . 34 9; and
number of gunshots reported, . 298.

As indicated in Table

28, the Spearman's rho parameters for variables were as
follows:

911 gunfire calls, -. 196; percentage of residents
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Table 2 7 . Pearson Correlations between Residents ' Reports ,
9 1 1 Calls for Gunfire, and Recorded Gunfire (N = 5 9 )

What i s
the
average
number of
shots
reported
for the
day?
What
percentage
of
residents
reported
the
presence
of
gunfire?

For thi s
day, how
many 9 1 1
cal l s for
gunshots
were
received?
*

Pearson
Correlation

What i s
the
average
number of
shots
reported
for the
day?

What
percentage
of residents
reported the
presence of
gunfi re ?

How many
gunshots
were
recorded
for the
interview
night?

For this
day, how
many 9 1 1
calls for
gunshots
were
received?

1

. 665 ( * )

. 2 98 ( * )

. 008

. 000

. 025

. 95 0

1

. 34 9 ( * )

- . 08 3

. 0 07

. 51 6

1

- . 15 4

S ig . ( 2 tailed)
Pearson
Correlation
. 6 65 ( * )

Sig . ( 2 tailed)
Pearson
Correlation
S ig . ( 2 tailed )
Pearson
Correlation

S ig . ( 2 tai led )

. 000
. 2 98 ( * )

. 34 9 ( * )

. 02 5

. 007

. 008

- . 08 3

- . 154

. 950

. 516

. 245

. 245

Correlation is s igni ficant at the 0 . 05 level ( 2 -tai led) .
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1

Table 2 8 . Spearman ' s rho Correlations between
Residents' Reports , 911 Calls for Gunfire , and
Recorded Gunfire ( N = 59 )

What is
the
average
number of
shots
reported
for the
day?
What
percentag
e of
residents
reported
the
presence
of
gunfire ?
How many
gunshots
were
recorded
for the
interview
night ?
For this
day, how
many 9 1 1
calls for
gunshots
were
received?

•

Correlat ion
Coefficient

What
What is percentage
How many
of
the
gunshots
average residents
were
reported
number
recorded
the
of shots
for the
reported presence
interview
of
for the
night?
gunfire?
day?

For this
day, how
many 9 1 1
call s
for
gunshots
were
received
?

. 770 ( * )

. 17 2

. 02 5

. 000

. 20 1

. 845

1 . 000

. 2 07

- . 0 30

. 119

. 817

1 . 000

- . 196

1 . 0 00

S ig . ( 2 tailed)
Cor relation
Coe fficient

.,r

. 77 0 ( * )

Sig . ( 2 tailed)
Corre lat ion
Coefficient

S ig . ( 2 tailed)
Cor relation
Coefficient

Sig . ( 2 tailed)

. 000

.,;'I • ,

. 17 2

. 20 7

. 2 01

. 11 9

. 02 5

- . 03 0

- . 196

1 . 00 0

. 845

. 817

. 1 37

.

. 1 37

Correlation is significant at the 0 . 0 5 level ( 2-tailed) .
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reporting the presence of gunfire, . 207; and number of
gunshots reported, . 17 2.
From areas A and B, there were 44 calls reporting
assault.

The hypothesis that residents' reports of gunfire

were correlated to reported assaults was not supported.

A

thought was that a willingness to report gunfire to an
interviewer might be correlated with calling for emergency
help when someone was assaulted.

This hypothesis was not

supported as shown by Tables 29 and 30.

The results from

the Pearson and Spearman' s rho correlatibns procedures (p >
. 05) were not statistically significant.
Summary of Results

The results of this study indicate that the percentage
of residents reporting the presence of gunfire was a valid
predictor of night gunfire.

The greater the percentage of

people reporting gunfire, the greater the number of night
gunshots recorded by ShotSpotter.

Residents' reports of the

actual number of gunshots were not valid.

Residents also

identified certain patterns of gunfire in their
neighborhood.
Saturday.
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Gunfire was more apt to occur at night and on

Table 2 9 . Pearson Correlations between Residents' Gunfire
Reports and 911 Assault Calls
How many

II 9 1 1 call s
I

How many 9 1 1
calls for
: assault were
received?
What i s the
average number
o f shots
reported for
t he day?

I

Pearson
Correlation

!

1

.

Sig . ( 2-tai led )

IN

Pearson
Correlation

for
assault
were
received?

64
I
I

- . 0 32

Sig . ( 2-ta i l - e d)

. 8 07

percentage Pearson
o f res idents
Correlation
reported the
presence o f
. gu_nfire ?
Sig . ( 2-tai l ed )

. 017

1 What

N

62

. 8 92

!
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Table 30 . Spearman ' s rho Correlations between Residents '
Gunfire Reports and 911 Assault Calls
--

--

How many
9 1 1 calls
for
assault
were
received?

I

Spearman ' s rho How many 9 1 1
call s for
assault were
received?

I

I
I

I

Correlation
Coe fficient

1 . 000

Sig . ( 2 tailed}

.

N

64

Wha t i s t he
Correlation
average numb�r Coefficient
of shots
reported for
the day ?
Sig . ( 2 tailed)

- . 006
. 961

N

1 What

percentage of
residents
reported the
presence of
gunfire ?

I
I

II

- - .

I
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I
I

S ig . ( 2 tailed)

. 0 15

--

N
--

62

Corre lation
Coefficient

. -

. 90 7

63

As indicated by the limited publicly available 911
information, calls for help were related to a person being
shot, in danger of being shot, or personal property being
damaged.

Calls were not made for random gunfire such as

when someone fired a rapid succession of shots into the air.
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CHAPTER VI
· Discussion and Xmp1ications

This chapter discusses the hypotheses of this study,
limitations of the study, and implications for future
research, policy, and practice.
Research Hypotheses

The first hypothesis of this study was that a positive
relationship existed between recorded counts of gunfire and
individuals' reports of gunfire.

The hypothesis was

supported in the following ways.

The relationship between

residents_' reports of the presence of gunfire and
ShotSpotter counts of night gunfire was statistically
significant.

The percentage of people reporting the

presence of gunfire was a valid indicator of recorded night
gunshots.

In addition, data from interviews and ShotSpotter

indicated that Saturday was the day of the week with the
highest level of gunfire.

Both data sources also identified

night as the time of day when gunfire was more likely.
The residents' reports of the actual number of gunshots
in the previous 24 hours were not valid.
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Previous gunshot

recordings and lack of precipitation were indicators of the
actual number of shots.
The second hypothesis was that a relationship existed
between recorded counts of gunfire and 911 calls about
gunfire.

This hypothesis was not supported.

Emergency

calls indicated that someone was shot, or in danger of being
shot, or that personal property was being damaged.

It

appeared that people did not call in response to random
gunfire.

Calls were related to personal hurt or damage.

What appeared to be a reluctance to report gunfire was
consistent with the findings by Travis (1996) that people
often do not report violence out of fear of retaliation.
The third hypothesis predicted that individual reports
of gunfire would have a higher correlation with recorded
gunfire than with 911 gunshot calls.
supported.

This hypothesis was

Residents' reports of the presence of gunfire

were a valid indicator of the presence of recorded gunfire.
The correlation between recorded gunshots and 911 calls was
not statistically significant.
The fourth hypothesis predicted that a . relationship
would exist between individuals' reports of gunfire and
reported assaults (two-tailed).

The thought was that
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/

reporting actual harm to someone would be related to
reporting gunfire�

This was not supported.

Perhaps part of

the reason for this was that most of the gunfire appeared to
be rapid successions of random gunfire with no apparent
target, whereas assaults usually had an identified target.
Linlitations of This Study

As indicated earlier, this was a beginning study of the
validity of people's reports of gunfire and recorded
gunfire.

The external validity of this study is low.

Many

replications of this and similar studies are needed for more
conclusive results. The main internal threat to the validity
of this study involved interrater reliability.
Interrater Reliability of Data Collectors

At various times this study had four different
interviewers.

The interviewers were trained regarding

concerns for confidentiality, protection of respondents, and
use of the instrument.

The first attempt at finding

interviewers was to have retired people conduct the
interviews.

This had much potential, but the referral

source primarily identif ied people that were having

18 2

significant health problems and hospitalizations.
second attempt was to find ·stay-at-home parents.

The
One

interviewer was not able to continue due to a fall and
surgeries.

Another had a change in personal circumstances

that precluded this work.

A p�oblem was that most people

wanted to conduct interviews occasionally rather than every
day.

A young adult working part-time seemed to do the best

j ob of fitting the interviews into her schedule.

Her mother

also agreed to work as her substitute if absolutely needed.
That interrater reliability was not computed and formally
reported was a limitation of this study.

At the beginning

of following studies, planning for interrater reliability
and locating a larger number of potential interviewers would
be important.
Similarly, interrater reliability was needed in
evaluating the ShotSpotter data.

A ShotSpotter consultant

listened to some recordings to verify that the sounds
recorded were gunshots .

There appeared to be agreement

among evaluators, but this was not computed and formally
reported.

No one listened to additional recordings and no

assessment of interrater reliability was conducted.
Recordings of distant shots were the most difficult to
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For day and evening hours, several possible shots

· identify.

were excluded because of the possibility that they might be
sounds related to construction work.
In addition, having someone check to verify that the
sounds were actually gunfire was not done.

With the actual

ShotSpotter system, a person checks to verify the presence
of gunfire.

That should only be done with a meticulously

designed safety protocol and by trained responders working
with the police department.

That would also include the

need for an interdisciplinary approach.

That was not the

nature of this study.
Placement of Sensors

As mentioned above, a concern was the placement of the
sensor.

Because of the level of break-ins in parts of the

area, safety of equipment was a major issue.

If the

equipment had been stolen, there would have been no
recordings.

The preferred location ' for the sensor would

have been buildings closer to the gunfire.

A problem was

that those buildings had a higher level of stolen property.
Equipment needs to be located on buildings considered best
for recordings purposes.
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Perhaps the best options for

placement of sensors will occur when the sensors become
wireless.

In this study, concern for safety of the

equipment superceded locating the sensor in the best
location for data collection.
A second reliability concern was also related to the
placement of sensors.

At least one additional sensor was

needed to verify the presence of a gunshot recording.
Preferably, the sensor would be on a different building in
the same area.

This would increase the accuracy of

determining whether a recording was· an electrical glitch or
a gunshot recording.

The impact of unreliable data reduces

both the statistical conclusion validity and construct
validity of this study.
Lack of Precipitation Data

One problem with data regarding the amount of
precipitation was a lack of information.

The closest

National Weather Service had hourly measurements of
precipitation, but that weather station received
substantially more rain than the target sites .

The weather

station had a greater amount of rain as well as more
frequent occurrences of rain.

An example was that over one
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inch was measured at that weather station, but only a trace
was measured at the sensor site.

A closer weather station

with less equipment had precipitation totals that were more
similar to total rain accumulation at the sites.

The

problem was that the close weather site only recorded total
amounts for 24 hour time frames.

They did, however, give a

narrative of when precipitation occurred such as midday or
night.
An interview day was defined as 24 hours prior to the
interview.
days.

This included time frames from two different

Therefore, the precipitation variable in this study

only indicated the presence of precipitation during the
interview time.

For future research purposes, a measure

that records hourly precipitation would allow for an
interval level variable.

In this study, exact measurements

of precipitation during the interview time frame were not
available.
Missing Data

In computing the ARIMA model for the dependent
variable, recorded gunfire, seven sequential days of data
were missing.
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This missing data were addressed by extending

the data collection time frame by seven days.

A possibility

for dealing with the missing data would have been to have a
mean substitution for each day of the week, but a larger
concern was having 12% of the dependent variable missing
from area B.

The impact of having the missing week of

gunfire recordings on the ARIMA model is not known.

The

external validity was reduced.
The remaining missing data for the independent
variables used in the analyses were less than 5%.

The

_ method for dealing with that . missing data was to use the
SPSS listwise procedure.

The exception was one independent

variable that was deleted.

It appeared that the question

for that variable was poorly designed.

People were asked

how many hours they were in their home or neighborhood the
previous day.

The question was not clear, and people were

not sure how to answer.

In addition, the missing data for

that question was 19. 3%.
Sampling Issues

The source for phone numbers in this study was the
current City Directory for the identified location.

People

without telephones were not included in the sample.
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Although a spokesperson for the City Directory stated that
cell phone numbers were included in the directory, the
inclusion of cell phone numbers was not evident.

In

addition, the directory included less than ten phone numbers
for people living in public housing.

Also, of the people ·

interviewed, 97. 9% had lived in their homes over three
years.

In addition, in each of the homes where interviews

were conducted, an adult had previously interviewed with an
employee of the City Directory.

A concern is that a

systematic bias may have existed among the people
interviewed.

The people interviewed represented a sample of

convenience and may not be representative of the population.
Thus, the statistical conclusion validity of the study is
impacted and results should be viewed with caution.
Another concern is the 19 . 14% refusal rate among people
contacted for interviews.
those people in person.

No attempt was made to interview
If the people who refused to answer

the questions had very different viewpoints, their
viewpoints were not indicated in the study.

Again, the

statistical conclusion validity is impacted by this lack of
information.
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Implications for Research

As mentioned, no comprehensive measure of community
violence exists.

Basic to the process of developing a

comprehensive measure of community violence is the need to
establish the validity of indicators of community violence.
According to Guterman, Cameron, and Staller, in the study of
community violence, "the existing knowledge base presents a
collection of groundbreaking studies that have documented
the extent and the profound impact of community violence in
young person' s lives.

However, taken as a whole, the

empirical work conducted in this area suffers from a lack of
consensus or even explicit discussion regarding the
parameters of ' community violence' as an important
phenomenon of study" (2Q O O, p. 5 80) .

The authors further

assert the need to clarify the boundaries and perceptive
elements involved in "violence" exposure and a need for
specificity in clearly demarcating the parameters of
community violence exposure.
The most frequently quoted measure of community
violence is the Uniform Crime Report which, according the
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National Crime Victimization Survey, underestimates violent
crime by 8 1% (2001) .

The NCVS has a more detailed reporting

of violent crimes, but it takes two years to complete. More
current measurements are needed.
Before beginning this study, several researchers ·in the
field of community violence were contacted.

Agreement was

expressed that an indicator that gave immediate feedback on
the presence of gunfire w?uld_ be extremely valuable.

Since

that time the ShotSpotter instrument was developed for
identification of the actual frequency of gunshots.
ShotSpotter appears to be a measure of community violence
that gives immediate feedback on the presence and frequency
of gunshots.

This study provides the basis for a simple,

current need assessment that identifies the current presence
of night gunfire in a neighborhood.
A simple need assessment that identifies whether night
gunfire is present gives researchers a tool for assessing
the current presence of gunfire.

Data collection of

residents' reports would probably be needed for at least a
month due to cycles of gunfire activity.

Levels of

periodicity from different locations would vary.
Generalizing the presence of gunfire from one location to

190

another would be inappropriate.

Again, the percentage of

people reporting the presence of gunfire appears to be valid
only for the hours between 5:01 p. m. and 12:00 a. m.
A second implication of this study is a need to further
study the impact of gunfire on people' s sleep.

Mitru,

Millrood, and Mateika indicate that sleep deprivation
reduces cognitive efficiency and results in decreased
academic performance and increased behavioral problems
(2002) .

With 96. 7% of the adults (N = 331) responding that

gunfire had bothered their sleep, more research is needed in
this area.

The impact of gunshots on the sleep patterns of

children and adults has not been researched.

This would be

most important to children and adults living in close
proximity to areas with frequent gunshots.
There is also a need for further research on gunfire
patterns.

Opportunities may exist for further exploring the

specific patterns of gunfire such as during the time frame
between 2: 00 a. m. and 4: 00 a. m. ; on a particular day of the
week ; with a certain range of atmospheric temperatures and
precipitation; and with certain patterns of autocorrelations
and seasonal autocorrelations.

Undoubtedly there will

always be unusual occurrences of gunfire that are totally
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unexpected and unusual for the location, but some random
gunfire patterns could perhaps be better understood.
Implications for Policy

A problem in some communities with gunfire is that
policy is apt to be tailored entirely by people who do not
live in the designated neighborhoods.

If the perception is

that people are sensationalizing the gunfire problem or that
the problem has already been solved,
concerns will be less
•
apt to be addressed.

Having a simple instrument that i·s a

valid indicator of the presence of night gunfire has the
potential for increasing the awareness of policy makers.
With community safety of children and their families being
an important responsibility of the community, this study
provides a tool for increasing awareness.
Implications for Practice

The implications of this study for practitioners
include an increased awareness of the problems facing their
clients.

A common occurrence for most practitioners is

working with children that have behavior problems.

An

example of using awareness of community gunfire presence was

1 92

demonstrated by one kindergarten teacher.

The teacher was

·aw��� that a particular child lived in a very chaotic
neighborhood with frequent night gunfire.

Rather than

pushing a very tired child to concentrate and work, the
teacher first allowed the child to nap.

The result was a

more rested child who progressed aca�emically and was well
behaved.

Rather than considering this teacher's approach as

a lowering of standards, the teacher used a simple strategy
that resulted in more effective programming.

Having an

increased awareness of the reality of this child's life,
resulted in the selection of a strategy that was beneficial
to the child.

Following traditional strategies of insisting

that the child concentrate and behave had previously
resulted in behavior problems and a frustrating day for the
child and teacher.
For many children receiving special education services �
an individualized plan is devised to meet their academic
needs.

Perhaps, for some children, the need for sleep is as

great as the need for lunch.

For children living close to

night gunfire, this is a possible consideration.

Also, as

indicated by the periodicity of the gunfire recordings,
additional rest may only be needed occasionally .
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Undoubtedly, other children also have home and community
environments that preclude getting enough r�st.

Mitru,

Millrood, and Mateika suggest a need for some ·-children
experiencing sleep deprivation to have delayed academic
schedules.

The question is how can the child's program be

tailored to assist the young person in developing his/her
potential?

It is interesting to note that one summer day

camp in the targeted area included a nap time for the
elementary and middle school age children.

This program

appeared - to have few behavior problems.
The implications of this study for programmers
attempting to reduce the levels of gunfire include (1)
access to a tool indicating whether night gunshots are
present, and (2) better use of resources to address the
problem.

For programs attempting to reduce the presence of

night gunfire, a current indicator allows practitioners to
regularly evaluate whether night gunfire is present.

This

could result in a more effective use of resources.
Concluding Statement

The responsibility for meeting the safety and academic
needs of children is important work.
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It is also a huge

responsibility.

The failures of institutions to meet those

needs have serious consequences for both the community and
the children.

Pretending gunfire does not exist is a highly

costly choice that effects children and their neighborhoods.
Awareness of the presence of gunfire provides for an
opportunity to design programs that realistically fit the
needs of more children.
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Questionnaire
Appendix A
If this is not a convenient time , try to make an
appointment to call againFor any of the following questions , if the person
says they do not know , ask them to give their best
estimate or guess .

1.

Do you ever hear gunshots in your neighborhood?
Yes
No

2.

Thinking back over the last week, which time of
day had more gunshots?
Day

(5:01 a. m. to 5:00 p. m. )

Night

(5:01 p. m.

to 5:00 a. m. )

Same
3.

To the best of your knowledge which day of the
week had the most gunshots in the last 7 days?
Monday--Tuesday--Wednesday--Thursday___
Friday---

4.

Saturday--Sunday---

Has gunfire ever bothered your sleeping?
Yes___
No

5 . It is now_______ o'clock. Over the last 24
hours, about how many gunshots did you hear in
your neighborhood?
6. About how many hours were you in your home or
neighborhood yesterday?
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7.

How long have you lived . in your present home?
less than one year--one to three years--three years or more---

8 . Do you have any questions?
If you have questions about your rights as a
participant, contact the Compliance Section of
The Office of Research at (865) 974-3466.
If you have any additional questions contact
Sylvia Sergent at (865) 237-7564.
Thank-you for your help.
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INFORMED CONSENT STATEMENT
Appendix B
A Criterion Va1iclity S tudy of Inclividua1s' Reports of
Gunfire and Recorded Gunfire

INTRODUCTION

Hello, my name is (Data Collector' s Name) .
I' m
helping with a study being conducted by the College of
Social Work at the University of Tennessee. Is this a
convenient time to call? The purpose of this study is to
better understand about gunshots in neighborhoods. The·
interview takes about 3-4 minutes. The questions are
about gunshots in your neighborhood. · All information
will be kept confidential and no names will be recorded.
No one will be able to identify who answers questions.
The interview is voluntary, and will not affect any
services you or your family receives. Also you may
decide to quit the interview at any time with no
penalties.
Do you have any questions?
Do you understand what the study is about?
If the person understands what the study is about , go to
the next section .
INFORMATION ABOUT PARTICIPANTS ' INVOLVEMENT IN THE STUDY

You will be asked to answer seven questions about
gunshots and your neighborhood. If you decide to take
part in this study, you may change your mind at any time
and quit the interview. Also if you feel stress
answering questions about gunfire, please do not answer
the questions. The study is to increase understanding
about gunfire, not to increase anyone ' s discomfort.
2 18

RISKS

There is a small risk that answering questions about
gunfire may -cause stress. To protect you, please do not
answer any questions that make you feel stressed. Also,
I have the phone numbers of two counseling centers in
case you feel the need to talk with someone. The
telephone numbers are 539-2409 and 521-6336.
BENEFITS

The benefit of this study is to gain a better
understanding of gunfire in neighborhoods.
CONFIDENTIALITY

The information in this study will be kept confidential.
Immediately after this phone call your address and phone
number will be shredded. Answers to questions will be
kept in a locked filing case available only to people
doing the research, and there will be no way to link your
name with what you tell me.
After the study is
completed the questionnaires will be kept on the U. T.
campus in a secure location for three years.
No
reference will be made in oral or written reports which
could link any participant to this study.
CONTACT INFORMATION

If you- have questions at any time about the study or
would like to talk more about this subject, you may
contact Sylvia Sergent, at 865-237-7564 .
If you have
questions about your rights as a participant, contact the
Compliance Section of The University of Tennessee Office
of Research at (865 ) 974-3466 .
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PARTICIPATION

Your participation in this study is voluntary. You may
decide not to participate or to quit at any time without
any consequences.
Are you willing to voluntarily participate in this study?
If no , thank the person for their time .
address and phone number .
If yes , continue with the questionnaire .
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